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Abstract
Background. Health information system security and privacy are critical issues that impact the
wide use of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) in healthcare including hospitals, providers and
health systems (Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2017). These issues have been
researched from a technology standpoint in this era of accelerated electronic health record
adoption, but less has been done related to the EHR users in the United States. Most of the
literature related to security and privacy explores research topics, peripheral and direct, regarding
policy adherence mechanisms. Yet to be studied is a social science exploration of nurses’ risk
knowledge and risk behaviors associated with security and privacy issues.
Purpose. This dissertation examines characteristics related to cybersecurity practices of new
nurses a year following graduation from nursing school where they may have been prepared to
work in environments with EHRs. The study will explore their understanding of cybersecurity as
it relates to use and protection of the sources of information in the EHRs, and their own personal
risk behaviors with mobile technologies that may put them at risk to outside hacking or misuse of
information. The questions that drive the study are the associations with nurses’ knowledge of
information system security, risk behaviors specifically with mobile device use, and their threat
appraisal that may influence their personal habits and their concern for potential misuse of their
own electronic health information.
Method. A web-based survey was emailed to a sample of new graduates who completed the
National Student Nurses’ Association (NSNA) Annual Survey and gave their permanent email
address voluntarily to be contacted again for additional surveys. The survey designed in
SurveyMonkey®, the same approach used with this sample in prior studies, was sent to a list of
3,000 addresses. The variables of interest are Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS),
i

Risk Behaviors (RB), Personal Technology Practices (PTP), Mobile Device Habits (MDH),
Threat Appraisal (Internal and External), Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP), and
Information Privacy Protection Response (IPPR).
Pilot Testing. Several measures developed for the study were tested on a sample of senior
graduating nursing students (n=167) to assess their validity and reliability, including KISS, RB
and PTP. Prior to data collection, the new items were assessed for content validity by five
judges in preparation to be tested for reliability analysis. A paper-pencil version of the new items
was distributed to the nursing students just prior to their graduation. Their responses were
entered and analyzed using SPSS, which yielded a final set of items with acceptable reliability (α
= .700), These new items were combined with the other variables of previously studied items,
slightly modified, for integration on the final tool. Additional demographic questions and mobile
device usage were added.
Procedures. The final survey was distributed to the list of participants (n=3,000), anticipating a
10 - 20% return rate that would yield 300 - 600 subjects. A reminder was sent every 2 weeks for
6 weeks while the study remained open. Participants were offered an incentive of being eligible
for a $250 drawing at the conclusion of the study.
Analysis. The first level of analysis included an extensive descriptive analysis of the frequencies
and measures of central tendency for subject self-reported mobile device frequency and types of
use. The subsequent analysis included a series of correlations calculated on the variables of
interest to determine the relationships of predicted relationships. The model did not support the
predictions and an adjusted model was proposed for future studies on the measured variables and
demographic variables of interest.
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Limitations. The pilot study was distributed in a paper format whereas the proposed format for
the national study used an electronic medium.
Conclusions. This study provided information about the relationship between the core variables
and demographic components. These findings could inform educators and employers about new
nurses’ knowledge and risk behaviors related to information system security.

Keywords: Electronic Health Record, Protection Motivation Theory, Security, Privacy,
Informatics, Meaningful Use, ARRA, HITECH, Cybersecurity, Risk
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Medical informatics has entered a new age. Resistive holdouts notwithstanding, electronic
health records (EHRs) are nearly omnipresent in the American healthcare system. Legislation
and government programs are guiding and accelerating the adoption of EHRs. There are
boundless benefits to providers, healthcare systems, governments, and consumers. However,
securing the right of protection of healthcare information is at an increasing risk as electronic
health records become more entrenched in our society. Examples of breaches, nefarious and
otherwise, are plentiful. Adopters are those hospitals, healthcare providers, practices, and other
segments of the healthcare delivery system that have adopted the use of an electronic health
record certified by a federal government sanctioned organization for the federal government’s
“Meaningful Use” program. “Meaningful Use” is a method of measuring for the purpose of
financial incentives the adoption and usage of a certified electronic health record under the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act as part of the
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Adopters of healthcare technology
may be held financially liable for breaches. These adopters are compelled to enter into incentive
programs introducing risks for which they may not adequately able to mitigate. To add further
insult to injury, the adopters arguably do not receive adequate government or vendor support to
prevent catastrophic breaches (Ong, 2015).
As good stewards of the dignity of healthcare consumers, healthcare institutions are
burdened with painstaking measures to fortify their efforts in the prevention of sensitive
information leakage in the new age of pervasive medical informatics. Under threat of crippling
fines, healthcare entities such as hospitals and providers must be vigilant in safeguarding
precious data while the threat of possible data leakage looms in part beyond their control.
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Overall, this new paradigm presents a paradox of data liberalization for the benefit of patients
with an increased risk of harm to the patients’ detriment.
Health Information Technology (HIT) has lagged far behind the technology of other
industries such as those in the financial sector. Speculatively, perhaps this lag may be in part due
to healthcare technology being classification as a cost within a healthcare business model. In
financial sectors, technology is a requirement to thrive or even survive. Financial database
systems have competed for the financial prize by edging out one another over milliseconds in
transactional speeds. Even the financial systems within healthcare are typically antiquated in
comparison to technology typical of the financial industry. To add additional pressures to the
mix, The Administrative Simplification Compliance Act of 2001 required that all Medicare
claims must be done electronically (“Medicare Mandates Electronic Claims,” 2003). This
transformational piece of legislation forced even the financial portion of healthcare to advance
into embracing modern information technology. In doing so, this legislation sparked a huge wave
in the transmitting of electronic protected health information (ePHI).
Electronic healthcare systems have evolved considerably since the inception in the latter
half of the twentieth century which saw the use of mainframe style systems, huge overhead and
very limited capabilities. These early systems were often limited to finances, registration, and
very few clinical components. The traditional paper chart remained in place for the most part
during this era while antiquated systems prevailed in pervasiveness. As the personal computer
started to become commonplace in the 1990s, so did its prevalence in hospitals to varying
degrees. According to Tuttle (1997), the 1990s saw a need in healthcare for computer systems
but a fragmented market coupled with a lack of scalable software.
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Very clumsy clinical applications began appearing moreover at the turn of the century.
Many of these early pioneers have their footprints in the applications of larger companies that
consumed them over the years. These systems were painful to interface with other proprietary
systems. Hospitals began adopting a “best of breed” approach by acquiring a mismatched set of
proprietary systems, which did not work well in an interoperable manner. Others took a more
uniformed approach selecting a single vendor for as many services and departments of the
hospital as possible. Using a single vendor approach for multiple system often resulted in a wide
spectrum of quality among these system modules as some portions of the product were the result
of a quick acquisitions to complete a vendor’s portfolio. Clinicians outside of hospital systems
were spared this experience generally, for the pen and paper were always 100% backwards
compatible with all prior systems. Today, however, this paradigm is rapidly changing.
Background of the Problem
A review of contemporary literature reveals that while there is an abundance of studies on
the impact of health information technology in healthcare, there is little focus on the
understanding of the safeguarding of electronic protected health information. There is a paucity
of literature that directly addresses the nurses’ information system security knowledge. None of
the studies reviewed makes subsequent associations with the personal characteristics of nurses
that would make them to be sufficiently motivated to protect information the way they protect
patients’ wellbeing in general. Understanding what motivates users to be protective – and
therefore vigilant in maintaining secure and confidential processes in their routines – may be a
precursor to their practices with using the EHRs and other patient-identifiable technologies in
clinical care. Protection Motivation Theory, a theoretical framework may appropriately serve in
the study of healthcare behavior but has not been applied to health care providers in this way as it
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has been to health care recipients related to their personal self-care activities. Furthermore, the
prevalence of mobile device use in the healthcare settings with nurses has not been factored in
risk behavior studies. Where studied, the mobile device portions of the survey instruments were
found to contain elements not relevant to commonplace usage in the United States and lacked the
smart technologies that creep into everyday use that are prevalent today.
Based upon the gaps found in the literature review, this author has developed a study based
upon both the use of existing instruments textured with the construction of a new instrument in
order to measure variables not previously reported in the body of available literature.
Background: Knowledge and Risk Behaviors
To study nurses’ knowledge of security and risk behaviors, it is less important to know
about the security and encryption literature which is extensive and highly technical, and more
essential to examine a way to understand human behavior as it applies to taking risk in general.
Background literature for this study includes an examination of existing reports of knowledge,
risk behaviors, and responses to the threat of security violations of users of HIT. Specifically, a
significant segment of healthcare breaches affecting 500 or more individuals has been attributed
to incidents with mobile devices. Between 10/21/2009 and 2/23/2017, 472 of the 1,847 large
reported breaches had a mobile component involved in the incident (calculated from Breaches
Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2017). Further exploration specific to nurses’ knowledge of
information system security, risk behaviors with mobile device use, threat appraisal of their
breaches in security, and their own sense of protection in response to the use of their own
electronic health records, i.e. personalizing their understanding of confidentiality and security, is
a framework to connect what nurses know and how they behave relative to their mobile devices.
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This model may inform healthcare entities how to minimize violations of security or external
infiltrations into their EHRs.
Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory has been well applied in the context of patient care
in that the “fear appeal” may invoke a protective response (Rogers, 1975). Rogers’ theory may
be applicable to the healthcare practitioner experiencing a protective response to a fear of
maleficence such as the inappropriate disclosure of protected health information. Such a fear
appeal should be based upon the recognition that certain behaviors may increase the likelihood of
such a negative occurrence.
In Protection Motivation Theory, the subject must analyze the existence of a hazardous
condition, have a perception about the efficacy of the prescribed course of action, and based
upon this threat appraisal elicit a protective response. In the case of nurses, the threat is the
potential unauthorized use or misuse of electronic protected health information. The efficacious
course of action would be the sound use of mobile devices. The protection response would be
their sentiment in the case of their electronic health information being potentially misused. This
is known as Information Personal Protection Responses, or the response to the threat appraisal
(Rogers, 1975).
For the subject to have a response, they must first recognize a threat and the efficacy of the
prescribed course of action. The method by which the threat and efficacy was evaluated is by
way of a knowledge survey. A study of medical students’ knowledge of cybersecurity was
examined in the context of mobile devices, rapidly becoming a fixture in the healthcare industry
(Whipple, Allgood & Larue, 2012). The study addressed the need to examine healthcare
professionals’ use of mobile devices and the associated risk behaviors that put protected health
information at risk. However, in so examining humans as the weakest link in the security chain
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the largest group of healthcare professionals was not in the scope of study. This study prompted
this author to develop an instrument for the purpose of studying nurses’ knowledge and
associated risk behaviors of mobile device use, a specific area of study not observed having been
examined in the body of reviewed literature. The areas to be explored were also influenced by a
study conducted in Turkey, reported as an assessment survey, administered to determine
cybersecurity awareness related to health information systems (Aydin & Chouseinoglou, 2013).
The questions driving this dissertation were based on the authors’ personal experience in
cybersecurity and the general need to know what new nurses learn in their education, what
electronic devices they may use in their clinical work, and what personal protective habits related
to security they may have adopted or not. Assessing their knowledge of cybersecurity is
fundamental to predicting their personal technology practices.
The knowledge level of nurses will establish a baseline for their understanding of the threat
appraisal and efficacy of their response to mitigate the threat to the proper use of electronic
health information. If these do not adequately mitigate their risk behaviors, it may be explained
by their personal sense of privacy or lack thereof. Whether or not a nurse treats a patients’
information the way they would want their own information to be treated could weigh into the
consideration of risk behaviors. Do nurses have concern about protecting patient information?
Do they respond in a way that is congruent with their own beliefs about protection of their own
information?
To evaluate the subjects’ Concern for Information Protection and their Information Privacy
Protective Responses as Rogers’ Protection Motivation mechanism, a study based upon patients’
perceptions was used as the basis for the instrument. Kuo, Ma, and Alexander’s 2014 study on
patient responses to violations of their protected health information protection demonstrated a
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predicted connection between one’s “concern” with one’s “protective responses.” By using this
parallel idea, assessing these concepts in nurses may provide insight on nurses’ motivation to be
vigilant in their personal technology habits related to patient information. This notion serves as a
basis for studying nurses’ responses to the threat appraisal of their own health records being at
risk. Furthermore, the study’s relationship among the elements of Information Privacy Protective
Responses and Concern for Information Privacy may serve in the overall model to uncover the
aspects of cybersecurity risk that nurses could be taught or motivated to minimize their risk
behaviors.
This study will examine the nurses’ knowledge of information security systems, their habits
with mobile device use, and the threat appraisal (internal and external) that may motivate them as
they relate to the subjects’ self-report of risk behaviors and/or safeguarding private information
as if it were their own health information. This will lay the framework for studying nurse risk
behaviors and the antecedents that may be ameliorated through an educational intervention.
Significance of the Problem
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 included stipulations for
improving the United States’ health technology infrastructure. As part of ARRA, The Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act provides financial
incentives for providers and hospitals, herein referred to as adopters, to adopt and implement
electronic medical record technology. Conversely, significant penalties exist for those who
choose to not adopt the technology. Computerizing patient data increases the risk of privacy
breaches for which severe financial penalties exist. Those adopting the technology may be ill
prepared to address privacy risk and are vulnerable for incurring substantial penalties. New rules
imposed from the phases of “meaningful use” now mandate institutions to demonstrate vigilant
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risk assessments and policies to manage numerous breach incidents. According to a 2012
Ponemon Institute study, 94% of hospitals surveyed experienced at least one data breach.
Under the HITECH Act portion of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
hospitals and providers face incentives to adopt and penalties for the failure to adopt an
electronic health record. Furthermore, they must demonstrate “meaningful use” in stages. The
current stage 2 of “meaningful use” requires hospitals to show that 5% of discharges must use
the patient portal.
The patient portal potentially increasing the risk of a breach as protected health
information and personally identifiable information is now mandated to be displayed in a
customer-facing, publically-accessible system. Any mistakes such as inappropriate disclosures
has the possibility to become calamitous. Between business associates, such as the patient portal
vendor and the healthcare entity (hospital or practitioner), HHS has mandated agreements which
could potentially reduce the liability of the healthcare entity. Potentially adding to the increase
in risk, electronic health record vendors had to rush to meet the “meaningful use” stage 2
specification deadline and bring these features to market. Hospitals then rushed to implement
and meet a goal that the majority of the nation’s hospitals failed to do. Following this rush, CMS
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Systems) delayed the requirement. However, many
institutions produced hastily-implemented systems across the country. Statistics of breaches
resulting from the patient portal are not available as CMS will only publish those settled cases
with 500 or more disclosures. Therefore, smaller breach episodes resulting from such hasty
activities have yet to be realized.
Mobile applications increase the risk of breaches for the simple reason that they are
mobile. Such devices are more readily lost or stolen than desktop devices and have the potential
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to expose large amounts of sensitive information. A significant portion of non-paper based
breaches of 500 or more individuals as reported by CMS indicates that mobile devices are most
often the culprit. Approximately one of every three non-paper large breaches involved a mobile
device (Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2017). The common theme is that these
lost or stolen mobile devices were not encrypted. Appropriately implemented encryption
provides a covered entity with a “safe harbor” provision essentially considering a breach highly
unlikely and therefore not reportable. Unfortunately, encryption is not a default standard
configuration of the most common laptop operating systems.
Tablets and smart phones may or may not be protected. Apple’s iOS is encrypted by
default, but controls may not be set up correctly to prevent disclosures. Android, the other
prevalent mobile operating system, varies from manufacturer to manufacturer and only in the
future will these devices be encrypted by default. Even Android encryption has been broken by
a variety of mechanisms including deep freeze – which actually requires one to freeze the phone
to a certain temperature before loading a ROM package. Apple’s latest offering supposedly
cannot even be undone by the company themselves even in the case of a law enforcement
request. However, without the mandated use of mobile device management solutions, the variety
of configurations leaves mobile devices at risk. According to a 2012 Ponemon Institute study,
60% of all workplace mobile phone users circumvent their devices’ security features. Therefore,
human behavior must be eliminated from the equation where possible to diminish the risk of a
breach.
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Problem Statement
Nurses, the largest group of healthcare professionals in the United States, use electronic
health records containing patients’ sensitive information. As employee mistakes rank among the
top sources of healthcare data breaches, nurse information system security knowledge and
behavior should be studied to possibly mitigate security risks and ultimately safeguard a
vulnerable population’s sensitive information entrusted to healthcare entities. Data breaches can
result in harm to patients by way of identity theft and fraud. Institutions may suffer financial
penalties and harm to their reputation. Such instances have been frequently reported by news
outlets (Ong, 2015). If health information system security knowledge can be improved through
intervention and it has any influence on nurses’ risk behaviors using mobile technologies, then
untoward consequences can be prevented rather than prosecuted. In other words, an effective
way of maintaining compliance with information system security practices may be to improve
the knowledge of the subjects and find methods to encourage such practices rather than endure
consequences to either personnel, the institution, and/or the patients. This content might be
taught before the new graduate nurse becomes employed. However, standardized specific
instruction on cybersecurity may be an elusive goal for nurse educators in the United States as
the variations of EHRs, with associated security features continue to proliferate and students
continue to use the latest electronic devices on the market. According to Gardner and Jones
(2012), nursing schools have by and large not integrated the EHR into their curricula. The
American Association of Colleges of Nursing (2008) offers in its latest guidelines for
baccalaureate nursing education elements about the use of clinical informatics systems without
mention of either privacy or security of the electronic information. According to available
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literature, there is a prevalent lack of standardized cybersecurity practices in undergraduate
nursing programs in the United States.
Study Aim
The aim of this descriptive study is to explore level of new nurses’ information system
security and mobile device risk behaviors along with their Information Privacy Protective
Responses, looking for patterns of relationships in users’ protection motivation and their
potential for breaches through risk behaviors related to health information technology (HIT) in
general and EHRs specifically. This study will provide information related to a currently
unstudied area of HIT security risk behaviors among nurses in preparation for future research on
information system security training in nursing programs.
Purpose
The purpose of this descriptive study is to explore in a national sample of new nurses one
year after graduation in their HIT knowledge about security and risk behaviors in their use of
portable electronic devices, their knowledge of information system security, and the influence, if
any, of their personal protective motivation to protect patient care information. This sample of
nurses that are homogeneous with respect to experience will provide a focus on how they were
prepared in their nursing education in relation to information system security in order to inform
educators in the future.
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Research Questions
The main question for the study is as follows:
What kind of activities do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, including
frequency of use, types of activities, and habits or behaviors that make them vulnerable to
security risk?
This overall question driving the study can be broken into a series of questions related to the
new nurses’ specific cybersecurity knowledge, risk, and personal characteristics including:
1. What is the level of knowledge of new nurses’ information system security (KISS)
related to patient privacy, security rules, and vulnerability to breaches or threats to
exposing protected health information (PHI)?
2. What is the nurses’ level of personal or mobile device risk behaviors and types of
personal technology practices which may pose a risk to health information systems?
3. What is the reported level and type of nurse mobile application use?
4. What is the level of new nurses’ Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) and
Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) factors?
5. What nurses’ characteristics and behaviors predict their Information Privacy-Protective
Responses (IPPR) based upon the Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP) factors
including:
a. medical facilities errors (ME)?
b. unauthorized access to medical information (UA)?
c. medical facilities secondary use of medical information (SU)?
d. personal collection of medical information (CO)?
6. What are the predominantly reported threat appraisals (internal vs external)?
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7. How do nurses’ threat appraisals mitigate their Knowledge of Information System
Security, their Privacy Protective Responses or their Risk Behaviors?
Proposed Model for the Study
The theoretical framework of Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) is a suitable
foundation to evaluate the Information Privacy Protective Response (IPPR) as the subjects’
reaction component to their Concern for Information Privacy (Rogers 1975, 1983). The PMT is
commonly used a framework for the study of patient responses to health threats as found in a
survey of literature. Essentially, the patient must have knowledge of a risk. The patient develops
a sense of a “fear appeal” (threat appraisal) or trepidation of said risk being realized along with
the negative aspects of the risk in question. The patient then has a sense of belief as to whether
the ascribed treatment would be efficacious. The patient would then adhere to the ascribed
treatment to varying degrees or perhaps non-adherence based upon their knowledge, fear
appeals, and belief in the efficacy of treatment.
Similarly, applying this to the proposed study, users of EHRs need knowledge about
security risk to promote their compliance with cybersecurity practices. This knowledge lays the
groundwork for behaviors that are influenced by the forces that shape their technology practices,
secure or risky. These forces may be personal motivation such as concern for information
protection, their information protective responses, their motivation externally or internally (threat
appraisal) to being compliant, and their increased use of their mobile devices. A potential
architype for this can be seen in the figure below Information Privacy Protective Responses
Pathway. The participants were be assessed for their knowledge, their individual protective
response as attributed to Rogers’ PMT, their fear appeal is their own CFIP index in whole and in
part as subscales of the CFIP and their self-reported practices and risk behaviors. This study
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examines correlations between knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and the IPPR response to the
CFIP as Rogers’ “fear appraisals” as they may be mediated by the threat appraisal of
punishments to self (internal) or causing harm to others (external).

Figure 1 Information Privacy Protective Responses Pathway
Concern For Information Privacy Subscale Definitions
The Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) index includes the subscales of Medical
Facility Errors (ME), Unauthorized Access to Medical Information (UA), Secondary Use of
Medical Information (SU) and the Personal Collection of Medical Information (CO) as its
subscales (Smith, Milberg & Burke, 1996). The subscales are considered as the various factors
of concerns to individuals that contribute to their overall concern for information privacy. The
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CFIP serves as the conceptual framework for the study. Subjects’ CFIP is evaluated using a
survey to determine their sentiment or concern for the usage of their own medical information
based upon the subscales which contribute to their overall concern.
Conceptual Definitions of Variables
•

Knowledge of Information Security Systems Index: This index measurement determines
the degree to which a subject has knowledge of information system security (KISS).

•

Concern For Information Privacy Index (CFIP): This index comprised of the below
subscales determines the degree to which a subject has concern for the protection of
information privacy; either their own or that of another subject.
o Medical Errors (ME): Errors may exist in the electronic health record. An
example may include mistyped information, another patient’s data, or a system
processing issue resulting in incorrect information present in an electronic health
record.
o Unauthorized Access of Medical Information (UA): This pertains to the condition
whereby individuals not authorized by the patient for access to the electronic
health record may obtain access. An example may be an institution workforce
member obtaining access to an electronic health record without a clinical or
business purpose. Another example may be the breach of electronic health record
system resulting in the leakage of electronic health information to potentially
nefarious actors.
o Secondary Use (SU): Electronic health record data may be stored by, manipulated
by, or transported to systems aside from the primary electronic health record. An
example may be the transfer of information to a shared healthcare network
database. Another example may be either prospective or retrospective research.
o Personal Collection of Medical Information (CO): The personal collection refers
to the gathering of electronic health information by an individual for personal use
outside of clinical or business needs. An example may be the printing of
electronic health information for potentially nefarious use.

•

Threat Appraisal: This is the perception of a threat and motivation to take action as a
result of this threat perception. An issue must be determined by a subject to be
threatening and the action must be understood to have efficacy as a mitigating factor
15

against such a threat. This concept is operationalized into categories of “internal” threat
to self (job, fines) and “external” threat/harm to others (hospital, patients).
Conceptual Definitions of Dependent Variables
•

•

Cyber Security Risk Behaviors (RB): This index measurement determines the
professional behaviors undertaken by a subject which could present a risk to the
protection of electronic information; either their own or that of another subject.
Information Privacy Protection Response (IPPR): This response to the Concern For
Information Privacy represents the intended activities to be taken by the subject to protect
the electronic information, health record or otherwise, against undue privacy
infringements.

Summary
In summary, this chapter has outlined the problem of increased electronic health record
prevalence in the United States as an increased security risk adjoined with employee mistakes as
a leading cause of security issues in healthcare organizations and practices with nurses
representing the largest segment of healthcare personnel and since mobile devices are becoming
ubiquitous. To decrease the human risks to protected health information, it is essential to
understand what nurses know about information system security and their motivation to protect
information as it relates to their risk behaviors. The descriptive study provides information about
new nurses in the United States with respect to their information system security knowledge, risk
behaviors associated with mobile device use, their concern for information privacy as indicated
by their own information privacy protective responses, and threat appraisal.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of literature with selected studies on the security of
health information that are less technical and more based upon human behaviors. It begins with a
background about HIPAA legislation and the mandates for EHR administrators that followed,
including a general description about expectations that are technically implemented and
regulations with punishments that were advanced for breaches in confidentiality. The chapter
also includes a description of the Protection Motivation Theory as the dissertation theoretical
framework, information system security knowledge studies, a foundational study on Information
Personal Protection Response, a social engineering review, and a brief literature review of
technical perspectives related to electronic health record privacy and security.
Health information system security and privacy have been researched in this era of
accelerated electronic health record adoption in the United States. This literature review
explores such research topics, peripheral and direct, regarding policy adherence mechanisms.
There is a large body of literature on the impact of health information technology and related
electronic health records (EHR), but less on the users of these healthcare organizations and
practices and even less on the new era of mobile devices. Yet to be studied is a social science
exploration of nurses’ knowledge and risk behaviors with security and privacy issues with the
focus on what they have learned in the nursing program and how much they bring to their new
role as RNs. This section will also examine the literature pertinent to this study including
medical students’ cybersecurity knowledge, Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory, response to
information privacy, response taxonomy, fuzzy logic, and social engineering.

17

In an effort to diminish the risk to protected health information in healthcare organizations
and practices, this study should inform nursing educators within the healthcare organizations and
practices as well as educational institutions about the knowledge of new nurses, their risk
behaviors with mobile devices, and motivation for preventing incidents related to information
system security.
HIPAA Rules In Action
The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) legislated the
protection of health information privacy (Gilley, 2009). This Act permitted Health and Human
Services to enact the Privacy and Security Rules of 2003 (“HHS delegates security rule authority
to OCR”, 2009). Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is tasked with
enforcing these rules. Both the rules and the enforcement capabilities have been further
strengthened under the HHS Final Rule of 2013 (Strauss, 2013). The OCR conducts periodic
audits of healthcare entities, responds to reports of potential healthcare-related privacy and
security issues, invokes penalties, and provides remediation guidance for breaches and
infractions (HCPro, 2013).
HIPAA has placed a layer of rules that users in healthcare organizations and practices of
health information data and personal health information, especially physicians and nurses, must
heed in their active provider roles. On the HHS.gov Health Information Privacy website (April
16, 2015), The Department of Health and Human Services summarizes the HIPAA Privacy Rule
as follows:
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“The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes national standards to protect individuals’ medical
records and other personal health information and applies to health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain health care
transactions electronically. The Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the
privacy of personal health information, and sets limits and conditions on the uses and
disclosures that may be made of such information without patient authorization. The Rule
also gives patients rights over their health information, including rights to examine and
obtain a copy of their health records, and to request corrections.”
Paper-based systems could be easily tucked away from prying eyes with little chance of
exposure en masse. Traditionally, charts could be copied, faxed, tampered with or viewed
without the likelihood of access being tracked. While this modality seems safe contrasted
against a backdrop of sensational cybersecurity headlines, large and small, paper-based breaches
have occurred and continue to remain a risk. But these pale in comparison with the proliferation
of new technologies and social media activities where providers such as physicians and nurses,
who are human, interact with mountains of protected health information (PHI) and its electronic
versions (ePHI) that may be vulnerable to security breaches and privacy violations. Healthcare
organizations and practices now have the added responsibility of oversight of the wide range of
computerized technologies in health and the ubiquitous systems of tracking health information.
Their key endeavors in an era of regulation and “meaningful use” now include active risk
assessment with the traditional maintenance and incident response/management of system
disasters. The figure “Key Endeavors of Healthcare Organizations and Practices Information
Systems Managers” shows some mainstay efforts of institutions to protect clinical systems.
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These include risk assessments, encryption for both information at rest and in motion, as well as
disaster recovery strategies.

Key Endeavors

Risk Assessments

Encryption

Disaster
Recovery

Figure 2 Key Endeavors of Healthcare Organizations and Practices Information Systems
Managers (Ong, 2015)
With the electronic health record, data is available via multiple sources, people and
systems. Along with this liberalization of information and massive accessibility come the
mechanisms by which to track, restrict access, and monitor for inappropriate access. It’s a brave
new world with an increase in both benefits and risks. Furthmore, emergening programs and
technology changes the manifestation of electronic health record usage and changes how
newfound risks may surface. For example, the 21st Century Cures Act (H.R.6 - 21st century
cures act, 2015) calls for EHR vendors to:
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“publish application programming interfaces and associated documentation, with
respect to health information within such records, for search and indexing, semantic
harmonization and vocabulary translation, and user interface applications; and….
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that health information from such records
are able to be exchanged, accessed, and used through the use of application
programming interfaces without special effort, as authorized under applicable law”.
Such legislation leads to the use of application progammer interfaces which essentially
requires vendors to open a portal into the electronic health record to other vendors. This changes
the expression of risk to ePHI and how controls to mitigate such risk must be considered.
Security Breach – Privacy Violations
Data security has at times been front and center on the news and on the minds of the
general public. Headline after headline, we are reminded of the potential pitfalls of living in a
connected world. American intelligence agencies have accused the Russian government of
hacking and other activities to influence the United States’ 2016 Presidential election (Shane,
Sanger, & Kramer, 2017). Prior to such revelations, the National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor turned whistleblower Eric Snowden exposed some of the NSA’s massive surveillance
activities. These disclosures have shaken the foundations of international relations and help to
create a narrative that America’s own government may be spying on their citizens. When
combined with the sensitive nature of one’s private health information disclosed to providers
with expectation of privacy, the public’s trust is threatened if that information appears to be
available for others to see.
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The following selected list suggests considerations related to the practices of securing ePHI:
•

How is ePHI access logged? Is there remote access by healthcare personnel, vendors,
and other business associates? Does anyone review or become alerted to potentially
inappropriate access? Remember that even trusted employees have been known to have
inappropriately disclosed information. Countless examples exist of information sold for a
variety of reasons. People have been jailed even after making only a scant profit.

•

Is information segmented in a fashion that limits access based on job role or even
physical location? Maybe one hospital unit should not have access to another’s. Maybe
a physician sees a different set of information than a clerk.

•

Is there an education program for the workforce to help in the understanding of
legislation and organization policies to which they must adhere? Are there
supplementary security awareness reminders? While ignorance is no excuse for the law,
HIPAA does compel entities to keep its workforce informed.

•

Is there a limitation on administrative access or even any access that goes unlogged?

•

Can tampering of information be prevented or at least be discovered?

•

What mechanisms are in place to prevent leaks from nefarious sources? (i.e. viruses,
hackers, scammers)

•

How secure is the information against damage – physical or otherwise? Are there
contingency plans in place for periods of inaccessibility?

•

Is there a disaster recovery, business continuity, and backup plan? Have you tested these
plans? Careers have been cut short in disaster scenarios when untested backups fail.

•

What mechanisms prevent accidental disclosure? Is there a data leak prevention system –
either comprehensive through a vendor or otherwise via piece-meal? Can employees
send patient files over email – internally and externally – where they reside ad-infinitum
in wait for a potential hacker to come along?

•

Is all sensitive data encrypted both at rest and in motion? An inadvertent disclosure could
be as simple as a download to USB thumb drive that gets lost or an unencrypted stolen
laptop. Stolen laptops are a huge source of breaches according to the Office for Civil
Rights. Proper encryption means the would-be thief just inherited a brick-shaped laptop
for all intents and purposes.

•

Are the security mechanisms reasonable to implement? If not, workforce members will
circumvent them. Anectodally, one company made everyone change their passwords
every day. The employees would gather every morning to choose the group password.
Only their username was different. In the case of extremely complicated passwords and
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different usernames for various systems, employees tend to place notes under their
keyboards on tape them to their monitors.
•

Is there an identity and access management solution in place? While this topic is
complex, consider how to ensure that only those with authorization obtain access. The
solutions may be technological in nature (single sign-on, self-service password resets) or
administrative (activation and termination notification).

Identity theft companies promote their services in light of these new menacing headlines. The
sensitivity of one’s health information makes privacy in the EHR even more important to
consumers. For example, a television advertisement shows a physician accidentally leaving a
patient data-rich laptop in a cab while rushing to a meeting. Of course, the identity theft
protection service thwarts the efforts of the thief who just happens to take the same cab
immediately thereafter. But the potential consequences of a health data breach are being
highlighted to the public. In this connected age of well-publicized data breaches, the general
public has become more aware of the threat to their privacy, sacred health information, and
finances. These create a suspicious consumer – and the health care workers using the information
need to fully appreciate the great responsibility placed in their trust. Yet nurses, the largest single
provider group using the healthcare organizations and practices’ electronic technologies, are
often perpetrators knowingly or unknowingly of vulnerabilities to the protections in place in the
EHR.
Social Engineering Behaviors – For Bad and For Good
Within the context of the information age, Social Engineering is the concept by which
individuals or groups are manipulated into disclosing information such as access credentials or
persuaded to elicit specific behavior responses (Greavu-Servan & Serban, 2014). A term
historically associated with social sciences, social engineering has become the subject of concern
in the computer security industry (Anderson, 2008, p.17). As diverse is the landscape of
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available information, a wide spectrum of potential effects and bounty resulting from social
engineering incidents may too be vast.
Identity theft, one prominent bounty of social engineering, often involves the use of
others’ names, banking information, social security numbers, and birthdates without the people’s
knowledge or permission (Hadnagy, 2010, p. 17). Medical theft involves the unauthorized use of
health data also known as protected health information which may possibly be obtained through
social engineering alone or in combination with other tactics. According to a 2012 study by the
Ponemon Institute, the economic impact of such theft in the United States is $41.3 billion per
year up 33.66% from the year prior.
It has become necessary for hospitals and health care entities to put technological
protections, educational interventions, and punitive policies to address the need to protect patient
information and to be in compliance with regulatory expectations. These efforts combine people
and products, designed to prevent, intercept, or threaten punishment of breaches in security. The
figures below show samples of how a covered entity (health organization) may implement from a
policy perspective the Health and Human Services guidelines for the administrative, technical,
and physicial controls of the HIPAA Security Rule. In these samples, every segment of each
safeguard category has an associated institution policy indicating how elements of the rule are
addressed.
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ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
Standards

Sections

Security Management Process

164.308(1)

Assigned Security Responsibility
Workforce Security

164.308(2)
164.308(3)

Information Access Management

164.308(a)(4) Isolating Health Care Clearinghouse Functions

Implementation Specifications
R=Required, A=Addressable
Risk Analysis
Risk Management
Sanction Policy
Activity Review
Authorization and/or
Supervision
Workforce Clearance
Procedure
Termination Procedures

Access Authorization
Access Establishment and Modification
Security Awareness and Training

164.308(a)(5) Security Reminders
Protection from Malicious
Software
Log-in Monitoring
Password Management
Security Incident Procedures
164.308(a)(6) Response and Reporting
Contingency Plan
164.308(a)(7) Data Backup Plan
Disaster Recovery Plan
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Testing and Revision Procedures
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Evaluation
164.308(a)(8)
Business Associate Contracts and Other 164.308(b)(1) Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Arrangements

Policy Number Policy Name
R
R
R
R
R
A

9100-204
9100-032
9100-032
9100-032
9100-033
9237(100-131
and 700-702)
A 9237(100-131
and 700-702)
A 9237(100-131
and 700-702)
R 9100-034
A 9100-035
A 9100-036
A 9100-037
A 9100-004
A
A
R
R
R
R
A
A
R
R

9100-038
9100-205
9100-039
9100-040
9100-040
9100-040
9100-040
9100-040
9100-042
9200-331

Risk Analysis
Security Management Process
Security Management Process
Security Management Process
Assigned Security Responsibility
See: Human Resources Policies
On Intranet
See: Human Resources Policies
On Intranet
See: Human Resources Policies
On Intranet
Isolating Health Care
Clearinghouse Functions
Access Authorization
Access Establishment and
Modification
Security Reminders
Protection from Malicious
Software
Log-in Monitoring
Password Management
Response and Reporting
Contingency Plan
Contingency Plan
Contingency Plan
Contingency Plan
Contingency Plan
Evaluation
Business Associate Agreements

Figure 3 Sample - Levels of Administrative Safeguards (Ong, 2015)
PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS
Standards
Facility Access Controls

Workstation Use
Workstation Security
Device and Media Controls

Sections

Implementation Specifications
R=Required, A=Addressable
164.310(a)(1) Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation Procedures

Policy Number Policy Name
A 9100-044
A 9100-015
A 9100-030

Maintenance Records
164.310(b) Acceptable Use Policy
164.310(c)
164.310(d)(1) Disposal
Media Re-use
Accountability
Data Backup and Storage

A
R
R
R
R
A
A

9100-045
9200-385
9100-041
9100-031
9100-031
9100-031
9100-031

Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation
Procedures
Maintenance Records
Acceptable Use Policy
Workstation Security
Device and Media Controls
Device and Media Controls
Device and Media Controls
Device and Media Controls

Figure 4 Sample - Levels of Physical Safeguards (Ong, 2015)
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TECHNICAL SAFEGUARDS
Standards
Access Control

Audit Controls
Integrity

Person or Entity Authentication
Transmission Security

Sections

Implementation Specifications
R=Required, A=Addressable
164.312(a)(1) Unique User Identification
Emergency Access Procedure
Automatic Logoff
Encryption and Decryption
164.312(b)
164.312(c)(1) Mechanism to Authenticate Electronic
Protected Health Information
164.312(d)
164.312(e)(1) Integrity Controls
Encryption

Policy Number Policy Name
R 9100-043
R 9100-047
A 9100-219
A 9100-029
R 9100-048
A 9100-046

R 9100-049
A 9100-050
A 9100-029

Unique User Identification
Emergency Access Procedure
Automatic Logoff
Encryption
Audit Controls
Mechanism to Authenticate
Electronic Protected Health
Information
Person or Entity Authentication
Integrity Controls
Encryption

Figure 5 Sample - Levels of Technical Safeguards (Ong, 2015)
In support of these sample endeavors is a matrix illustrating how the Health and Human
Services Office for Civil Rights facilitates the privacy and security undertakings of covered
entities in pursuit of compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule. The agency holds a balance
between privacy and security, a public access arm, tools to facility compliance, and an
enforcement segment.
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Balanced
Policy

Public
Awareness

Compliance
Tools

Enforcement

Privacy

Access

Security Rule/Risk
Analysis

Complaints/Higher
Penalties Under
HITECH

Security

YouTube

Mobile Devices
Video

Breach Reporting

ONC Collaborations

Audit

De-Identification
Guidance

State Attorneys
General

Figure 6 Office for Civil Right Facilitates Privacy and Security (Ong, 2015)

Social Engineering by design involves the manipulation of human behavior (GreavuServan & Serban, 2014, P. 5). The HIPAA Security Rule (Administrative Safeguards, §
164.308(a)(5) 45 CFR Subtitle A, 2003) addresses this vulnerability by requiring healthcare
entities to “Implement a security awareness and training program for all members of its
workforce (including management).” Using the notion of Social Engineering in reverse, perhaps
efforts can be constructed to positively influence people who are frequent users to internalize and
protect patient information as part of their work life. By recognizing the predictors of motivation
to protect information, interventions aimed at users may be constructed.
These new efforts must take into account the multiple potential entry points with the growing
proliferation of mobile devices and social access to a wide range of tools and information that
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may be useful and/or purely social. These boundaries have become less clear. In order to plan for
and develop interventions that address future breaches, it is important to study the knowledge
and behavior of those who are vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional threats to patient privacy.
Nurses represent the largest group of healthcare professionals according to a July 13, 2015
United States Department of Labor report (TED: The Economics Daily Image, 2015) and
therefore represent the largest workforce group mandated to receive security awareness training.
Furthermore, the growth and adoption of population health endeavors may speculatively seem a
changing role for nurses potentially increasing their use of technology and their oversight of
information in healthcare spaces such as primary care.
As part of an overall effort to minimize breaches and exposure of patient sensitive health
information, this study will explore the user side of EHR security and the variables that may be
pivotal in risk behaviors or susceptibility, knowing that mobile devices will continue to grow and
be part of the healthcare systems currently in place. The Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP)
theoretical framework from Smith et al (1996) based upon the Rogers (1975, 1983) “Protection
Motivation Theory” (PMT), this study focuses on nurses one year after graduating from nursing
school, to determine their knowledge, risk behaviors, and personal beliefs related to privacy.
This group may give insights into what nurses learned in their education as it carries into their
first year of work. It seeks to explore the information privacy-protective responses (IPPR) of
nurses (the largest single user group who access protected patient health information routinely)
and how it might predict their likelihood of risk behaviors of security breaches related to their
increase use of mobile devices. Knowing what predicts the likelihood of risk behaviors of
security breaches including the nurses’ susceptibility and/or lack of knowledge, the researcher
was able to develop an intervention that combines education with social engineering strategies to
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produce users of EHRs and other healthcare technologies who internalized motivation to protect
ePHI.
Theoretical Framework: Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is centered on Ronald Rogers’ Protection
Motivation Theory (PMT). This theory may be considered chiefly pragmatic for studies
pertaining to subjects’ recognition of health consequences resulting in a fear appeal and their
associated response mechanisms (Rogers, 1975, 1983). This new nurse study uses the same
protection motivation and fear appeals mechanism in overlaying the new nurse’s sentiment of
protecting their own sensitive information with the relationship of protective responses vis à vis
the subjects’ information system security risk behaviors.
In Rogers’ 1975 article “A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude
Change” along with his 1983 revision “Cognitive and Physiological Processes In Fear Appeals
and Attitude Change,” a concept was formulated describing the relationship between fear and the
reaction to this given recognition of fear. Initiating the process is the components of the fear
appeal as magnitude of noxiousness, probability of occurrence, and efficacy of recommended
response. In other words, the motivation for protection originates at the recognition that an event
is perceived with a potential degree of harm at a particular degree of likelihood and that the
recommended response is calculated with a certain degree of effectiveness. For example, a
patient must appreciate that non-adherence to a prescribed diet may have likely concrete
consequences which would be significantly averted by adherence to the recommended regimen.
Based upon these factors, the patient may elicit a protective response.
In the Cognitive Mediating Process, the fear appeal is evaluated. The noxiousness is
appraised. The probability is evaluated as the expected likelihood of the event’s occurrence.
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The efficacy of the recommended treatment is deliberated as a possible coping response. These
factors lead to the protection motivation (Rogers, 1983).
Categorically, the fear appeal and cognitive mediating processes lead to an attitude
change. In the above instance, the patient may make the determination that the diet will work
and thus adopt an adherence to said regimen.
Rogers discusses the fear appeal process in the context of the power of persuasion. He
issues a disclaimer of his theory’s limitations. There are vast arrays of confounding variables
which could potentially affect the response outcome. Applying this notion to fear appeal as it
relates to how nurses appraise the noxiousness of a breach in security from a few perspectives:
(a) a personal protection motivation that connects the breach of security for one’s own
information and how that information might be abused; (b) an internal threat that a breach will
result in something bad happening to oneself such as punishment or loss of job; (c) an external
threat that a breach will result in harm to one’s patient or the hospital. In this study, new nurses
as subjects self-report their behaviors using mobile devices and their secure practices to protect
access to their own or hospital information. While the fear emotion may not be adequately
conveyed through a survey, the nurse assessment was based upon considering themselves as the
affected victims of potential breaches in cybersecurity and how this may or may not influence
their secure cyber practices.
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Violation of Information Privacy Responses
The violation of information privacy protective responses was a study conducted in Taiwan
with patients. Elements of the study and the results shaped the development of examining nurses’
information privacy protective responses and concern for information privacy as variables in the
dissertation that may predict risk behaviors, particularly with mobile devices.
In Kuo, Ma, and Alexander’s 2014 study on patient responses to violation of information
privacy, the taxonomic structure of Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) operated as
the unifying resultant of factors such as Collection (CO), Unauthorized Access (UA), Secondary
Use (SU) and Medical Errors (ME) within the framework of Rogers’ Protection Motivation
Theory. The Taiwan-based study was conducted in a hospital with patients in the investigation of
their concerns for information privacy and resulting protective responses in reaction to factors
which may lead to the invasion of patients’ privacy. The study cited reasons for the increasing
pervasiveness of the electronic health record in the health industry leading to the foreseeable
accompaniment of the healthcare entities’ ethical dilemmas and patients’ privacy concerns. The
variables were found to be factors that were interrelated and predictive of the participants’
reported protective responses. By using this structure and known relationships, this dissertation
modifies the elements to apply to the nurses themselves, interpreting the questions as if the
information in the EHRs was their own.
By applying this study to the dissertation focusing on new nurses in the United States as
subjects with whom the Information Privacy Protective Response mechanism can be explored, a
potential motivating factor of shaping safe, secure practices might contribute to behaviors in
addition to the knowledge nurses might have about cybersecurity. The Kuo study refers to the
plethora of sensitive information held by the electronic health record and the potentially
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devastating consequences to the affected patient population should an unauthorized disclosure or
breach occur. Medical data can be considered as quite sensitive and harm can ensue if
mishandled. The authors go on to infer that the risk increases as data accumulates over time.
The study’s purpose is to assist those entities in a position to improve the mechanisms designed
to protect patients’ private information.
The authors specify that only a scarce, limited amount of studies regarding patient concerns
for their information privacy have been completed. Their study uses the Protection Motivation
cognitive appraisal of threat in the context of perceived risks to the electronic medical record
privacy and the Information Privacy Protective Responses as the Protection Motivation resultant
effect. These findings are specific to the population studied but may be useful to other
populations such as nurses themselves. These authors present the notion that the perceived threat
to the security of the electronic health record should result in a decrease in risk behaviors
contributing to the likelihood of such threats being realized and thereby considering the attitude
change as a privacy protection behavior by means of the protection motivation conduct.
The study selected a Southern Taiwanese hospital that provides medical services with
nearly 1300 inpatient beds and a near average of 5000 outpatients seen daily. Four interviewers
recruited a convenience sample of subject by what the authors describe as approaching patients
“randomly” to conduct in-person interviews for 5 to 10 minute periods. In research, randomness
typically refers to the random assignment of treatment. Random selection would be the use of
selecting from an available pool of subjects. This study in effect used a convenience sample of
subjects who self-selected to partake in the study upon approach of recruiters.
The survey collected demographic information in the first section coupled with the second
section of privacy concerns and subsequent protective responses. Using a 5-point Likert scale,
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measures from prior empirical studies were translated into Chinese and categorized into
collection, secondary use, unauthorized access, and medical errors. The Concern for Information
Privacy (CFIP) scale involving these factors was modified to suit the context of the electronic
health record. A group of ten patients served as a pilot study for the purpose of eliminating
extraneous or otherwise unsuitable elements.
The Structured Equation Model (SEM) was used to test the hypotheses using the partial
least square (PLS) as no distributional assumptions were made. The results included 204
subjects out of 300 invitees with demographic details congruent with the general population of
Taiwan only slightly younger and more educated.
Reliability and validity were tested in confirmation of the measurement model. The
measurement items within the constructs were scrutinized as confirmatory by factor analysis
resulted in three of the twenty-one items being discarded. The construct validity testing resulting
in all approved items receiving a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of at least 0.7.
Bootstrapping was performed using 1000 re-samples showing support for the four hypotheses
save for the link of unauthorized access link to the Information Privacy Protective Response.
According to the study, subjects seemed to feel that too much of their patient information
was collected by medical facilities thereby causing some discomfort. The authors suggest that
only a minimal data set of information should be retained by the medical facility. The subjects
did not seem concerned with the potential for unauthorized access. The authors attribute this
phenomenon to patient familiarity with the medical staff. Perhaps the sample contained
individuals who were more educated than the general population and had confidence in
healthcare staff as possible peers. The subjects did, however, express concern over secondary
use of information beyond the intended purpose. Secondary use is required for billing,
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insurance, and pharmaceutical payers among other recipients. The authors suggest limiting
secondary disclosures where applicable and having prior approval before the release of
information could take place. Regarding errors, subjects showed concern over the potential
inaccuracy of their medical information and effect on patient safety. The authors suggest that
patients cannot review their data for accuracy and that medical facilities must take it upon
themselves to protect electronic health records from alterations and inaccuracies. Please note
that in the United States, regulations require healthcare entities partaking in the “Meaningful
Use” incentive program to not only provide a patient portal but are required to have a percentage
of their population log in as well. Therefore, patients in the United States may review a subset of
their chart and potentially request corrective action as warranted.
The study examined the breadth of patient privacy concerns and their responses. The study
sought to suggest increases in lacking protections as the proliferation of the electronic record
continues over time. The study did not connect the concept of access by individuals outside of
the medical facility, a factor of concern in the era of regularly reported breaches of medical
information. The authors implore medical facilities and government entities to develop
mechanisms to reduce patient privacy concerns related to the electronic health record. The study
has expanded the use of the Concern For Information Privacy framework to the electronic health
record paradigm and validated the instrument in the context of the healthcare setting thereby
narrowing the gap of information found in the body of pertinent literature.
Medical Students’ Knowledge of Privacy and Security
In another non-technical study on information system privacy and security, third year
medical students of a Midwestern university in the United States were surveyed for their
knowledge of information system privacy and security. Their reported activities using mobile
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devices was found to be in near ubiquitous use among the sample representative of the institution
(Whipple, Allgood, & Larue, 2012). This rapid increase in mobile technologies appears to be
worldwide and notably among young people, including students.
The researchers found the students’ knowledge of information system privacy and security
to be lacking and therefore sought to establish a baseline of their familiarity with this essential
subject matter particularly with mobile device use. A set of 67 respondents were provided with
clinical situations to determine their concern for information privacy.
The results showed that all respondents used their phone for voice communication and 94%
for text messaging. Respondents noted only 76.9% used the internet. Due to the subjects’
interpretation of the question and gap in their knowledge of the technology, this author would
suggest the number is likely to be 100%. The interpretation of several results such as internet
use suggests that there are significant knowledge gaps and/or perhaps limitations in the manner
in which survey questions were constructed.
Consistent with results conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2012) with workforce
members, these students bypassed a key security mechanism on their phones more than half the
time. The author noted the same with the “PDA” (Personal Data Assistant), a term that fell out
of use roughly a decade prior to their study but suggestive of perhaps tablet use in its place.
However, the institution in question also used this outdated PDA technology to operate a
software package. Given the availability of advances in technology in the mobile device sector,
one may presume that these functionally-limited PDA devices were likely used almost
exclusively for work-related purposes. Scenarios included the sharing of information via the
YouTube video sharing service and Facebook, the predominant social media service. As
infractions of protected health information have been reported in the media by way of both of
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these services, the use in scenarios provides for a realistic conduit by which to comprehend
medical student mobile behavior which may place the privacy and security of patient information
at risk for inappropriate and potentially unlawful disclosures.
The forty question Mobile Device Questionnaire (MDQ) was provided to 67 students at the
commencement of their third year of medical school in attendance of an intersession activity.
Only a single student claimed to not have a mobile phone. The survey was initiated with
demographic details followed by mobile devices use, security knowledge, and concluding with
clinical scenarios issues. The authors concluded that more education needs to be provided to
medical students regarding information system security and privacy due to the ease at which data
may be shared through mobile devices both purposely and inadvertently.
A principal focus of the finding is centered on the students’ lack of mobile device locking.
(This author notes that the major vendors of such devices have increased security mechanisms
and encouraged the use of said mechanisms as default configurations over the years since this
study was conducted. Furthermore, mobile device management solutions requiring the locking
of devices with complex passwords have been created and available to institutions to safeguard
such devices.) While still a relevant area of study, the period of time and sample studied may not
be indicative of the experience of new nurses from across the United States in the year 2016.
Some of the survey questions in the MDQ were used by this author to develop items for the
dissertation. Several items required adaptation to suit the target nurse audience and with
clarifications or modifications reflective of technology in modern use. For example, “Notepad”
is vendor-specific application available on a specific mobile device operating system found to be
in near obscurity at the time of this dissertation draft. “Address Book” is merely a contact list
that all participants likely use with every interpersonal interaction. Responses to the question are
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likely to be more indicative of respondents’ awareness of how the technology is used rather than
whether or not the technology is in use by the subject. These were all considered in the
development of the survey for this study.
Most telling and arguably of foremost value is the subject responses to scenarios indicative
of behavior, possibly putting sensitive information at risk. Such scenarios served as models for
the instrument directed at nurses with the goal of similarly identifying and describing nurse risk
behaviors. In the Whipple et al. (2012) study, more than a quarter would leave their device
unprotected and alone for up to an hour. More than half did not take issue with sending
protected health information to a professor via email and reading such content submitted to them
via email on their mobile devices. Depending upon institutional policies and protection
mechanisms in place, such activities may be considered as contributory to mobile device risk
behaviors and therefore certainly revealing of a likely educational opportunity for these student
programs.
The authors concluded that third year medical students are far enough along in their
program to have hopefully been exposed to information protection education in having had
exposure to the clinical setting. Their study may be informative to those studying mobile
security risk behaviors in other populations and serve as a basis for further study in other
populations of interest in the contemporary healthcare and technology worlds.
Fuzzy Logic of Cyber Security Knowledge
Cybersecurity knowledge was studied as Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey and
analyzed using fuzzy logic. Participants included 86 administrative subjects, 69 physicians and
86 students with various unspecified categories of health-related studies. The study provided
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results, interpretation of the survey outcomes, and guidelines for the application of fuzzy logic to
other healthcare institutions (Aydın, & Chouseinoglou, 2013).
The article provides a compelling account of the significance of cybersecurity mechanisms
in health information systems and the rationale for student subjects as “digital natives” expected
to be the predominant information system user base within the upcoming decade. The persuasive
explanation of cybersecurity risk is detailed as a rationale for conducting such an investigation of
cybersecurity habits.
The authors outline a precedence for the use of fuzzy logic in healthcare research. Defined
therein is fuzzy logic as a linguistic methodology for qualitative modeling thereby deducing
human knowledge to a mathematical elucidation. Results are not considered a constant, but
rather gradually measured and without certitude. For the results, researchers had determined a
baseline of information system training finding the vast majority of students and physicians not
having received any, while roughly two-thirds of administrative staff had this deficiency. The
amount of time spent on the internet seemed to influence the degree of risk behaviors and
potential for information security incidents.
A five-point Likert scale with 80 questions out of a total of 89 was applied to 470 subjects
using an instrument tested by 62 experts for reliability and validity judgment with a Cronbach’s
alpha statistic estimate of 0.935. Rich data consisting of upper and lower limits by demographic
category and instrument item were yielded.
The instrument items contributed in the development of this researcher’s new nurse survey.
However, either perhaps due to the translation from native Turkish into English or through the
choice of terms invoked by the translators, this author’s sentiment is that the articulation of
several objects’ phrasing could better be served to invoke the intended inquiry of the subject.
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Furthermore, some of the technology described therein the study was found to either be obscure
or otherwise outdated such as the LimeWire application. Other items such as “citizenship
number” may be considered as regional-specific and perhaps substituted with an item of similar
concern for subjects within United States. The same regional-specific applicability would apply
to technologies perhaps more prevalent in Turkey than in the United States such as the use of
Skype as a chat service.
The authors noted that while their study could provide some insight into risk behaviors
with users of health information system, the results should be considered as specific to the
institution in Turkey. Results may differ among studied populations. However, a principal goal
of this study is to serve as a model or framework for further studies using fuzzy logic in the
context of safeguarding health information systems.
Social Engineering
Within the context of the information age, Social Engineering is the concept by which
individuals or groups are manipulated into disclosing information such as access credentials or
persuaded to elicit specific behavior responses (Greavu-Servan & Serban, 2014). A term
historically associated with social sciences, social engineering has become the subject of concern
in the computer security industry (Anderson, 2008, p. 17). As diverse is the landscape of
available information, a wide spectrum of potential effects and bounty resulting from social
engineering incidents may too be vast.
Identity theft, one prominent bounty of social engineering, often involves the use of
others’ names, banking information, social security numbers, and birthdates without the people’s
knowledge or permission (Hadnagy, 2010, p. 17). Medical theft involves the unauthorized use of
health data also known as protected health information which may possibly be obtained through
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social engineering alone or in combination with other tactics. According to a 2012 study by the
Ponemon Institute, the economic impact of such theft in the United States is $41.3 billion per
year up 33.66% from the year prior.
Kevin Mitnick and William Simon (2003) echoed a dire warning of how even the most
stringent of traditional security mechanisms may be thwarted by unsuspecting individuals
performing their duties in good faith.
“A company may have purchased the best security technology that money
can buy, trained their people so well that they lock up all their secrets
before going home at night, and hired building guards from the best
security firm in the business. That company is still totally vulnerable.
Individuals may follow every best-security practice recommended by the
experts, slavishly installed every recommended security product, and be
thoroughly vigilant about proper system configuration and applying
security patches. Those individuals are still completely vulnerable.”
(p. 3)
Following upon the premise styled by Kevin Mitnick that humans are likely to be the
source of breaches in the milieu of most strident security mechanisms, Aydın and Chouseinoglou
(2013) likewise identified health information system users as the Achilles’ heel of information
security. Researchers cited sources supporting the assertion that risks from inside the
organization, both accidental and purposeful, produced the key offenders of security. As a result,
these researchers focused their study on newly graduated subjects from Turkey in the evaluation
of their security awareness using a fuzzy analysis, a system with precedence in studying health
information systems. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the security awareness of health
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information system workers in Turkey with varying degrees of information system knowledge
and experience. In doing so, the researchers have developed a gauge to determine areas of
deficiency necessitating further intervention.
Social Engineering by design involves the manipulation of human behavior (GreavuServan & Serban, 2014). The 2003 Security Rule addresses this vulnerability by requiring
healthcare entities to “Implement a security awareness and training program for all members of
its workforce (including management).” Nurses represent the largest group of healthcare
professionals in this workforce according to The United States Department of Labor (2015).
Therefore, nurses speculatively would be expected to be a proportionally significant recipient of
such training. This study examines the security awareness, social engineering aspects of
Registered Nurses in the United States, in healthcare organizations and practices of all sizes and
configurations across the country, with the common aspect that they all graduated less than one
year prior to the study from an accredited institution.
Social engineering has garnered a reputation as a deceptive force of nefarious intent in
the context of elaborate and high-profile information systems theft. However, social engineering
theories such as Roger’s Theory of Protection Motivation may be germane to the preservation of
information system privacy and security.
According to Rogers (1975):
“A protection motivation theory is proposed that postulates the three
crucial components of a fear appeal to be (a) the magnitude of
noxiousness of a depicted event; (b) the probability of that event's
occurrence; and (c) the efficacy of the protective response. Each of these
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communication variables initiates corresponding cognitive appraisal
processes that mediate attitude change.” (P. 93)
In other words, appealing to subjects’ nature that severely adverse events are likely to
occur in a particular instance should increase the protective responses in these subjects. Rogers
(1983) later introduced the concept of “fear appeals.” A modern example might be a commercial
showing young drivers briefly texting and seemingly a moment later being airlifted for medical
treatment as a deceased friend remains by the tragic accident.
Kuo, Ma, and Alexander (2014) referred to the theory of protection motivation in
studying a patient population in Taiwan to find a relationship between their healthcare
information privacy concerns and protective responses. In doing so, researchers discovered the
specific matters of importance were related to collection, possible inaccuracies, and additional
uses of their private health information. Unauthorized access by staff members did not elicit
protective responses. This study served as a barometer reading for hospitals to appreciate patient
concerns in the context of preserving a positive standing while commissioning the use of an
electronic health record. In this context, the protection response mechanism is the dependent
variable being measured in a population of Taiwanese patients and may or may not be
generalizable to the population in the United States.
Systematic Technical Perspective Review of Electronic Health Record Systems
Rezaeibagha, Win and Susilo (2015) performed a systematic, technical review of electronic
health record systems examining elements of privacy and security using grading criteria based
upon industry standards.
The systematic review explicitly omitted the element of mobile devices as stated in the
authors’ exclusion criteria. Mobile device use as a potential risk factor in maintaining the
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privacy of EHR information is a key element in this dissertation study. The omission in the
technical review further builds a case for the need to explore an element of healthcare technology
that is rapidly increasing in prevalence. In addition to the absence of mobile device use, the
authors note the study limitation exclude factors such as administrative and organizational
aspects of electronic health record data safeguards.
The authors used the International Organization For Standardization (ISO), International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standardized elements to review the security and privacy
components of various electronic health records to evaluate the security and privacy elements of
the system described therein the literature examined literature reviews. The ISO standards used
include ISO/EIC 27002:2013 and 2900:2011. Findings were outlined in the review and included
a matrix of each system graded against multiple elements of the ISO/EIC standards.
Rezaeibagha et al. (2015) summarized their investigation findings of the technology-based
evaluation and highlighted the following determination:
“Our findings demonstrate, regardless of the enormous effort required,
well defined access control policies should be mandated in order to
provide patient privacy by limiting the access rights to patient data with
proper access control policy language and standards. Applicability of
privacy and security rules and scalability of EHR system implementations
can be provided with proper architectures and frameworks, cryptography
techniques and policies.” (p. 30)
In other words, the authors stress the imperative of invoking technical safeguards for the
protection of electronic health record systems. The various implementation manifestations of
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such safeguards, while imperative to address the international standards, may diminish but do not
eliminate the human behavior risk factors examined in this dissertation.
This meta-analysis surveyed literature reviews of electronic health record systems from a
technical perspective using international standards as evaluation criteria. The authors expressed
study limitations related to mobile device use and administrative controls which are associated
with human risk behaviors. These study limitations are explored by way of this dissertation
study.
Nursing Education: National Student Nurses’ Association (NSNA)
The National Student Nurses’ Association provides cybersecurity guidance for its members
in part to protect the privacy of patient information. This information has been made available
on the NSNA website page section titled “Recommendations for: Social media usage and
maintaining privacy, confidentiality and professionalism”.
The NSNA highlights risk to the safeguarding of patient information related to student
nurses’ use of social media outside of the work and school settings. The guidelines state that
although institutions may provide guidance in their setting, student nurses’ behaviors can pose a
risk to the integrity of patient privacy and ultimately pose a risk of sanctions to themselves,
especially when common practices of sharing information with peers electronically is
commonplace. Healthcare organization and practice policies demand vigilance in protecting the
privacy of patients and abhors sharing information outside of sharing with other providers who
have a right to that particular information. Such verbiage lends itself well to the “threat
appraisals” portion of Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory in that the threat and consequences
are provided to the subject for appraisal.
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The scope of social media includes the use of both web-based and mobile social platform
and outlines contemporary social media services as examples of platform types. The guidelines
not only provide context by referencing HIPAA and examples of how social media activity may
lead to breaches, but also discuss the protection of the public perception of nurses. The
guidelines do not only provide verbiage of caution to its members, but they also tout the virtue of
social media when used appropriately.
The National Student Nurses’ Association members have been provided with social media
guidelines in an effort to protect patient privacy. The information contained therein the
guidelines are particularly suitable to include in this literature review as the targeted membership
audience services in part as the subjects of this dissertation study thereby providing a contextual
backdrop of education germane to the study (Recommendations for: Social media usage and
maintaining privacy, confidentiality and professionalism.2018).
Nursing Education: National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSB)
Like the National Student Nurses’ Association (NSNA) guidelines for its members’ social
media use, the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) provides a similar
direction (White paper: A nurse's guide to the use of social media.2011). These guidelines point
out the beneficial uses of social media while cautioning about its pitfalls which could lead to the
improper disclosure of patients’ protected health information. This document provides education
on social media use in the context of federal regulations such as HIPAA and site fictitious
examples of how improper use made lead to inappropriate disclosures.
The document also provides information about consequences to the patient as well as the
nurse. As with the National Student Nurses’ Association guidelines, these consequences are in
alignment with the dissertation’s theoretical framework of using Rogers’ Protection Motivation
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Theory “threat appraisals.” The nurses should understand the threat and the perceived efficacy of
the treatment to mitigate the identified threat. In other words, the guidelines show the threat of
consequences and provide the means by which to mitigate such consequences.
In both social media document guidelines, the threat of nurse-invoked breaches is placed
into the context of social media use, but such guidelines are applicable as general safeguards in
the workplace. These documents serve as a reference for the type of educational material nurses
may receive in safeguarding protected health information by decreasing risk behaviors with the
use of electronic devices.
Summary
In summary, this chapter explored pertinent literature regarding the technical safeguards,
baseline education of nurses in behavior-based threats to patient privacy, social engineering,
cyber-security knowledge, mobile device use, and the theoretical framework of Rogers’
Protection Motivation Theory.
Through the literature review, gaps in the literature have been identified thereby
necessitating the need for a national study of new nurses one year post-graduation to determine
their information system security knowledge, mobile device use, risk behaviors, Concern for
Information Privacy, level of Information Privacy Protection Response, the internal or external
threat appraisal, and associations among these factors.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the study, research design, study population,
sample and sampling procedures. With two new measures developed for the study and several
existing measures modified for the national study, a full description about the instrument
development in stages and pilot study data analysis are described.
The Pilot Study to Develop the Measures – Study Variables
This study examines the associations between variables in the proposed model of nurses’
knowledge, concern for information privacy, threat appraisal, risk behaviors, and information
privacy protective responses. The following variables are operationally defined.
Risk Behaviors (RB): The information system risk behaviors factors associated with mobile
device use amongst new nurses are variable results in the measurement of an overall risk score.
These self-reported behaviors were compiled by the investigator, derived from several sources in
the literature and developed into a measure (RB) of 21 items that are summed to yield a score
from 0 to 21. These items and the resulting measures were assessed for content validity and
reliability in the pilot study.
Knowledge of Information System (KISS): The knowledge of information systems security
factors are variables presented to the subjects on the questionnaire. The level of nurses’
information system security knowledge is a score from the survey questionnaire items resulting
in an overall score that measures their information system security knowledge. The items were
influenced from and authored similarly to studies conducted to assess medical students’
knowledge of patient privacy and security issues concerning mobile devices (Whipple, Allgood,
& Larue, 2012); health information system users’ awareness of security issues (Aydın &
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Chouseinoglou, 2013); but essentially authored by the investigator. The items selected for use in
the survey were compiled by the investigator into a Knowledge of Information System Security
(KISS) score ranging from 0 to 28 which was later slated for reduction to a range of 0-24
following the item elimination process. Each multiple choice item was considered as a single
point in value with one point yielded per each correct response. These items and the resulting
measures were assessed for content validity and reliability in the pilot study.
Concern For Information Privacy Index. (CFIP): The protection response mechanism of the
use of the nurses own electronic health record is based upon the Concern For Information
Privacy CFIP. This instrument was modified from the study by Kuo, Ma and Alexander (2014),
incorporating additional items by Smith, Milberg and Burke (1996). It is composed of several
subscales. The instructions for the items were changed to capture the nurses’ response about his
or her own personal information. The CFIP sum scores range from 0 to 15. The reliability was
assessed in the pilot study.
CFIP Subscales: The subscales of the CFIP include the factors medical errors (ME),
unauthorized access of medical information (UA), secondary use (SU), and personal collection
of medical information (CO). The CFIP sum scores range from 0 to 12.
Mobile Device Practices: The level of nurses’ information system security risk behavior
and personal technology habits with mobile devices is another variable. The sum risk behavior
scores range from 0 to 10 with the higher score indicating riskier behavior practices.
Information Privacy Protective Responses: Measuring the nurses’ response to how they
would feel about their own electronic health record use or information privacy protective
responses (IPPR) mechanism is a dependent variable. Examined are the associations between
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risk behaviors with the CFIP and IPPR. The sum scores of the IPPR range from 0 to 8 for the
pilot.
Threat appraisal: This is the perception of a threat and motivation to take action as a result
of this threat perception. This variable is operationalized into categories of “internal” threat to
self (job, fines) and “external” threat/harm to others (healthcare institutions, patients). The four
items are rank ordered by the respondent and sorted by rank in to threat groups.
Pilot – Data Collection
Prior to data collection, the investigator developed new items for the Knowledge and Risk
Behaviors measures based on the literature and the investigator’s professional experience. These
items were presented to five judges with advance information system and/or security knowledge
in order to assess for content validity. See the Appendix H - Content Validity: Student Nurses’
Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors. Items were revised to
consensus of form and wording. These were supplemented by the modified items on a
questionnaire used in the pilot data collection.
On March 16, 2016, a pilot survey was distributed to Molloy College nursing students in
advance of the subsequent nation-wide survey to be conducted with National Student Nursing
Association member participants. This class of seniors completed the survey in paper-pencil
form with all of the items on one questionnaire. These preliminary items were assessed for
reliability based on the data collected.
Sample
A sample of 167 third year Molloy College nursing students attending a scheduled group
scholastic event served as subjects for the pilot study. With IRB approval for the pilot study as
shown in Appendix D – Molloy College Institution Review Board Approval, this convenience
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sample completed the survey and delivered them to the researcher in unmarked envelopes to
maintain anonymity.
The Molloy College graduating nursing students completed all the items on the paperbased survey. The descriptive, correlational study was intended to assess participants’
knowledge, information security risk behaviors with mobile devices and information personal
protection responses to inform the researcher. The full study recruited new nurses one year
following graduation from nursing school to obtain a national sample of volunteers who were
members of the NSNA and had previously agreed to be surveyed in the future about their new
jobs. Using this homogeneous group related to education as a criterion negates the possible
influential factors deriving from a plethora of circumstances and involvements in subjects’
occupational experiences. While subjects may vary in age, their nursing practice would be held
constant to interpret the findings closer to issues related to their recent education than their life
experiences in multiple healthcare institutions, controlling somewhat for education across all
respondents.
Design and Instrument Development
The survey consists of demographic details, an information systems security knowledge
assessment section, appraisal of risk behaviors and information privacy protective responses.
The demographic section blended SurveyMonkey® certified items with population specific
interest items to inform the researcher. The knowledge section was entirely developed solely by
the principal investigator. The information privacy protective responses section used items
modified from the Kuo, Ma, & Alexander study ( 2014). This collective instrument was
evaluated by a jury of five subject matter experts and modified to suit the elicited feedback. The
fuzzy logic study from Aydın and Chouseinoglou (2013) spurred the development of the risk
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behavior elements of the instrument’s development. Many of this study’s elements in many
respects referred to technology that is either currently not trending in usage or not relevant to the
population in question being studied. Therefore, elements were selected where relevant and
altered to reflect the current information technology landscape and perceived potential usage
among the population of interest. The knowledge survey was also developed by the dissertation
author and submitted to the same jury of experts during the same period that the risk behavior
elements were distributed for evaluation. See Appendix H - Content Validity: Student Nurses’
Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors for details.
The demographic information included on the survey was drafted to be congruent with
the National Student Nurse Association annual survey questions. The pilot study demographics
were not used in the analysis.
Procedures
The investigator-developed measures were first assessed for content validity and prepared
for data collection to assess reliability.
Content Validity Index and Item Elimination Process
The knowledge and risk behavior portions of the survey instrument were developed in
advance for the pilot through validation of five expert jurors. Following the content validity
analysis, the survey was prepared for distribution.
The surveys were distributed to 167 senior nursing students as a convenience sample. The
surveys were delivered as paper-pencil instruments by two Molloy College professors. Three
$25 Amazon gift cards were offered via a raffle and participation in whole or in part was not
deemed to be a requirement for entry into the raffle. Students were instructed that their
responses were to be kept anonymous and no identifiable data was requested. Students were
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permitted to abstain from part or even all the survey responses. Students submitted the paper
responses to the professors who collected and delivered the responses to the study investigator
for evaluation.
Knowledge Instrument Item Elimination
The sample results served to finalize the knowledge instrument. One subject was
eliminated due to minimal participation in the survey. Others who did not respond to a question
were graded as incorrect for that question. Those elements which received less than 50% correct
response from the subjects were considered as eliminated for the instrument to be used for the
national survey.
Furthermore, items were examined for the percentage correct by all pilot subject and
graded on a shaded scale shown in the figure Elimination of Knowledge Items as either above,
below, or near the 50% mark. All items found to be below the 50% mark were eliminated as part
of an item discrimination and difficulty index manner of assessment for item elimination and
retention.
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Figure 7 Elimination of Knowledge Items
Human Protection
A Molloy College Institution Review Board application was filed and approved prior to
conducting the survey process. Subjects were advised that participation was completely
voluntary and without coercion. A statement to the voluntary nature of the survey was placed
upon each page header along with the option to omit part or all the survey item responses. In
addition, the header stated that all survey submission information would remain anonymous and
participants’ names were not requested. Three Amazon gift card valuing $25 USD were awarded
by a random raffle conducted by instructors with the explicit understanding that survey
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omissions, in whole or in part, would not have been considered disqualifiers for participating in
the award activity. The principal investigator maintained an active Collaborative Institutional
Training Initiative Graduate Nursing Biomedical certification throughout the survey collection
process.
Reliability Statistics Methodology
The reliability statistics elimination process incorporated psychometrically sound steps
involving the reduction of items that did not support the intended scale and subscale
measurements.
Reliability Statistics – Knowledge Test
The knowledge questions were tallied for each subject to produce an overall knowledge
score. With 28 items, an N=126, and an exclusion of 40 participants, the Cronbach’s alpha
statistic estimate was .769. A reduction of items to 24 provided a Cronbach’s alpha statistic
estimate of .775 and those items could be used for the nationwide survey. In the final survey, 27
items were selected for use based on the item content (See Appendix H - Content Validity:
Student Nurses’ Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors).
Reliability Statistics – Risk Behaviors
A total of 10 participants with incomplete data were removed leaving an N=157. A
Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .728 was obtained following the elimination of 5 of the 21
items thereby leaving 16 items remaining for the nationwide study.
Reliability of Investigator Developed Measures
Using a thorough process of examining each item for its item discrimination index,
difficulty index and coefficient alpha analysis, items were eliminated. The Knowledge of
Information System Security (KISS) received a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .775 after
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eliminating four items and leaving 24 remaining. The Risk Behaviors (RB) score received a
Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .728 after eliminating five items and leaving sixteen
remaining. These revised and finalized items were included on the SurveyMonkey® survey to
the participants in the full study.
Threat Appraisals
The Threat appraisals (Internal and External) are 4 statements where respondents are
asked to rank order them in the order of how much they perceive them as a threat, or in other
words would “worry about” the consequence. These rankings are mutually exclusive. The
statements were developed to yield assigned “threat” ranks to each respondent for the four items
representing “internal” (I) or “external” (E) threat groupings. The statements were operationally
defined by the rank of the perceived threat for respondents, yielding a grouping for each threat
and differentiated as “internal threat appraisal” (i.e. an undesirable consequence that affects the
self, such as losing a job, position, or being fined) and “external threat appraisal” (i.e. an
undesirable consequence that affects others including hospital fined or patients’ privacy
exposed). The survey included these four statements with the following instruction:
To measure Threat appraisal (I) and (E): Which of the following statements reflects your
motivation to keep your patient information on the EHR secure? Rank order from lowest (least
worry) to highest (most worry) (1 to 4).
Table 1 Threat Appraisal Taxonomy
INTERNAL THREATS

___ I would worry about fines on me or my loss of position.
___ I would worry about my loss of employment.

EXTERNAL THREATS

___ I would worry that my patients’ privacy would be exposed.
___ I would worry that my hospital would be fined.
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Reliability Statistics – Concern for Information Protection (CFIP) Total and IPPR
•

•

The Cronbach’s Alpha for all CFIP factors, including the IPPR, was found to be .890
with an N=153 after 14 participants had been excluded due to insufficient participation in
this section of the survey.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for IPPR was .704 for 6 items, an N=156, and an exclusion of 11
participants.

Reliability Statistics – CFIP Subscales
•
•
•
•

The Cronbach’s Alpha for UA, a subscale of the CFIP index, was found to be .861 with 3
items, and N=163, and after 4 participants had been excluded.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for SU was .883 for 3 items, an N=161, and an exclusion of 6
participants.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for ME was .875 for 3 items an N=159, and an exclusion of 8
participants.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for CO was .887 for 4 items, an N=159, and an exclusion of 8
participants.

The Full National Study
The main question to be answered by the national study includes: What kind of activities
do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, including frequency of use, types of
activities, and habits or behaviors that make them vulnerable to security risk? With the pilot
study complete and a final survey instrument refined based on the pilot data, the full study was
done on a national sample of new nurses in the United States. This descriptive, correlational
study was done using an electronic version based upon the original paper survey and distributed
via SurveyMonkey® to a list of 4,352 students from the National Student Nurses Association
(NSNA) database of student members who graduated in 2016 and voluntarily provided their
email addresses for follow-up.
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Sample
The National Student Nurses Association (NSNA) database was used to derive roughly
4,352 email contacts of RNs throughout the nation who have granted permission for follow-ups
from past surveys. An approximate 30% of responses was anticipated to provide a samples size
of approximately1000.
Per a 2009 Economic Modeling Specialists International report, an estimated 190,615
individuals completed a nursing program. Without considering factors precluding graduates
from being registered nurses one year later and assuming the 2009 figures are roughly an
indicator of current graduation trends, the estimated sample size accounts for 0.53% of the
population of all newly registered nurses. This study was estimated to have a 0.8 sufficient
power and a medium size significance at α = 0.05. With a 95% confidence interval and 5%
accepted margin for error, a population size of 190, 615 and 50% response distribution would
require a sample size of 384.
Therefore, an estimated sample size of 1000 would exceed the required 384 as a
sufficient sample size.
National Student Nurses Association Membership
Per the NSNA website, this nonprofit organization was founded in 1952 for enrolled
nursing students with a dedication to fostering the professional development of nursing students.
With over 60,000 members, this organization has representation through the United States
including all fifty states, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
Its mission is “to mentor students preparing for initial licensure as registered nurses, and to
convey the standards, ethics, and skills that students will need as responsible and accountable
leaders and members of the profession.” (NSNA, 2015).
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According to Feeg and Mancino (2015), this organization has conducted annual webbased surveys over the past seven years including recently graduating past members who agree
to receive follow-up surveys.
Method
A sample of new nurses with approximately one year of experience completed a webbased survey. The descriptive, correlational study acquired participants’ educational experiences
to inform the researchers. Using the limited experience among nurses as a criterion reduces the
possible influential factors deriving from a plethora of circumstances in subjects’ occupational
activities, including likely limiting the exposure to security awareness training though the
employer. The HIPAA Security Rule requires workforce awareness training for covered entities
such as hospitals and physician practices. Therefore, reducing work experience limits the
subjects’ likely exposure to employer training. Subjects may vary in age while the analysis of
the data reflects that the work experience factor is controlled.
Population Studied
The population consists of new nurses throughout the United States who were members
of the National Student Nurse Association. This database provides the investigator with a
national sample of nurses from all types of hospitals or health care organizations with similar
experience at the time of the study. These individuals gave their permanent email addresses for
future studies. They had graduated approximately one year prior.
Sample
The sample drawn from a list of more than 4,000 past members of the National Student
Nurse Association who willingly agreed to volunteer for surveys by giving their email addresses.
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Recruitment Method
The NSNA has a database of members, a subset of which are graduates who have agreed
to receive surveys. The NSNA had permitted the distribution of surveys although they retained
control over the distribution and at no time did the principal investigator have access to the
member database or the ability to distribute the surveys. The SurveyMonkey® application allows
for blinded email addresses to receive the survey with assurance of anonymity. Each invitation
had information about the survey, estimated time of duration to complete the survey, and an
option to be eligible for a $250 drawing. Using the Dillman, Smyth, & Melani (2008) method of
distribution, subjects were recruited and reminded with subsequent mailings.
Variables Specified – Instrument Items (Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey))
Descriptive Variables
•

Demographics – Items 1-5

•

Personal Use of Mobile Devices (PUMD) – Items 8-11

•

Personal Technology Practices (PTP) – Items 12-15

•

Mobile Device Habits (MDH) – Item 16

Aggregate Measures
•

Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS) – Items 18-44

•

Risk Behaviors (RB) Score – Item 17

•

CFIP: Concern for Information Privacy – Items 6, 7g-j)

•

Subscales of CFIP:
o UA: Unauthorized Access to Medical Information (6a-c)
o SU: Secondary Use of Medical Information (d-f)
o ME: Medical Facility Errors (g-i)
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o CO: Personal Collection of Medical Information (7g-j)
•

IPPR: Information Privacy Protective Responses, a response to the CFIP – Item 7 (c-h),
Items 7a-b omitted to elevate the coefficient alpha=.758 with 6 items

•

Threat Appraisal as a measure of statements (Internal and External) – Item 45

Refer to corresponding items as listed in Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey).

Descriptive
Variables
Aggregate
Measures

• Demographics - Items 1-5
• Personal Use of Mobile Devices (PUMD) - Items 8-11
• Personal Technology Practices (PTP) - Items 12-15
• Mobile Device Habits (MDH) – Item 16
• Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS) – Items 18-44
• Risk Behaviors (RB) - Item 17
• Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP) - Items 6, 7g-j
• Subscales of CFIP - from CFIP items
• IPPR - Item 7 (c-h)
• Threat Appraisal - Item 45

Figure 8 Descriptive Variables and Aggregate Measures

60

Relational Variables
The variables studied in relation to the CFIP include the information system security
behaviors of the subjects specifically with mobile devices. Examined are the relationships
between this behavior and the CFIP. Knowledge is considered to be the precursor and another
variable for which relations with other variables were examined. Threat appraisal may play a
mediating role. Particular demographics may influence risk behaviors as well and is also tested.
Procedure
The survey was sent via SurveyMonkey® to the eligible list of subjects’ email addresses
with a statement of informed consent and information to proceed. The list was supplied by and
the delivery managed by the National Student Nurse Association (NSNA). Subjects were
instructed that their participation was voluntary, and responses considered to be anonymous. An
incentive of a $250 gift card raffle was offered to a single participant selected at random out of
those who voluntarily include their email address for follow-up on the raffle results. This
information was technically de-identified from the response set of answers to the survey
questions. Participants were informed that their email addresses collected for the raffle and
survey responses would be collected and kept separate.
Data Collection Methods
The data were collected electronically via SurveyMonkey® and sent without subjectidentifying factors to the principal investigator.
Hypotheses
A series of hypotheses were tested on the variables of interest. A correlation matrix for
selected variables were done to determine where and if relationships among the variables exist.
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The preliminary correlation analyses allowed further consideration of specific tests of models
derived from the literature and theory. These focused on the following hypotheses tested:
Hypothesis Statements
H0: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses does not result in a decrease
in identified risk behaviors.
H1: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses results in a decrease in
identified risk behaviors.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
identified risk behaviors.
H2: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in
identified risk behaviors.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
Concern for Information Privacy.
H3: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern
for Information Privacy.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
Concern for Medical Facility Errors.
H4: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern
for Medical Facility Errors.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information.
H5: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern
for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information.
H6: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern
for Secondary Use of Medical Information.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information.
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H7: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern
for Personal Collection of Medical Information.
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in
Information Privacy Protective Responses.
H8: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in
Information Privacy Protective Responses.
H0 An increase in Concern for Information Privacy does not result in a decrease in
identified risk behaviors.
H9 An increase in Concern for Information Privacy results in a decrease in identified risk
behaviors.
H0 An increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors does not result in a decrease in
identified risk behaviors.
H10 An increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors results in a decrease in identified
risk behaviors.
H0 An increase in Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information does not result
in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
H11 An increase in Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
H0 An increase in Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information does not result in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
H12 An increase in Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information results in a decrease
in identified risk behaviors.
H0 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information does not result
in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
H13 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
H0 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information does not result
in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
H14 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
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Threat Appraisals – Stated in the Null
For the threat appraisal hypotheses to test knowledge, risk, concern or protective response
mean score differences by rankings of threat on each of the four statements of threat, the
hypotheses are stated in the null:
Internal Null Hypotheses: Internal threats are not associated with knowledge, risk, concerns
or protective responses.
External Null Hypotheses: External threats are not associated with knowledge, risk,
concerns or protective responses.
Ethical Consideration and Consent – Human Subject Protection
The study was submitted to the Molloy College Institutional Review Board (IRB) for
approval. The National Student Nurses Association (NSNA) managed the correspondence to the
eligible sample so that the researcher could not identify participants who do not self-disclose
their email addresses by choice.
The information collected must be kept completely identified and anonymous. Subjects
may have trepidation about disclosing their professional behavior and knowledge should they
perceive a possibility that this information may be associated with their identity and recorded.
The absence of requesting employer information is intended to encourage socially desirable
responses. Using the anonymity function of SurveyMonkey® assured respondents that their
information could not be shared with anyone. The separation of their information from their
request to be eligible for the $250 raffle was done electronically. No identifying information can
be associated with any answers.
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Analysis
Descriptive analysis of the survey statistics on this national sample for items that assess
mobile device use, frequency of use and other behaviors. The demographics and variables of
interest are described with frequency statistics and measures of central tendency. As preliminary
tests of inter-correlations between the subjects’ knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR,
correlation and regression analyses were done. Threat appraisal was established as categories for
each of the four threats and used to test differences in study variables by participants’ threat
ranks.
The results of the survey in SurveyMonkey® were exported in SPSS format and into
SPSS Version 23 for analysis. Descriptive, correlational were done if the data met assumptions
and the measures were deemed reliable. Analysis of the CFIP index and its subscales for
granularity were evaluated for associations with knowledge, risk behaviors, and the subjects’
IPPR and threat appraisal.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Introduction
The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore in a national sample of nurses one year
after graduation in HIT knowledge about security and risk behaviors related to their use of
portable electronic devices, their knowledge of information system security, and the influence, if
any, of their personal protective motivation to protect patient care information. This sample of
nurses that are homogeneous with respect to experience provided a focus on how they were
prepared in their nursing education in relation to information system security in order to inform
educators in the future. This chapter presents the sample characteristics, descriptive summary of
the general responses, and psychometric properties of the measures used in the research
questions. It summarizes the overall questions and then specifies and tests hypotheses for the
final research questions. Finally, summaries the general and specific findings to begin to
construct a model for understanding the main research question and sub-questions:
1. How much do new nurses know about security of information systems and does
their knowledge influence their risk behaviors in using mobile technology?
a. What kind of activities do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies,
including frequency of use, types of activities, and habits or behaviors that
make them vulnerable to security risk or concern about protecting patient
information?
b. What is the level of new nurses’ knowledge, risk, concern for information
privacy, their protective responses to information privacy; how are these
related and affected by their threat appraisal (internal or external) to
themselves, their hospitals, or their patients?
c. Is knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses influenced by select
demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education (education type
or school type)?
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Using Dillman’s (2008) method of distribution, subjects were recruited via an email
distribution to NSNA members who were one-year post-graduation and had agreed to be
contacted for survey purposes. The result yielded 649 returned SurveyMonkey® surveys from
nurses. Analysis of the data resulted in the removal of 135 respondent results as they did not
complete the knowledge section of the survey. Therefore, a sample of n=514 was selected for
analysis as the responses were either fully or nearly fully complete. Information pertaining to
phone type is not analyzed with other variables and stood alone for analysis. Therefore, all
respondents who provided this information were used for an N=550, not just the 514 who
completed or nearly completed all elements in the survey.
Characteristics and Demographics
For all of the characteristic and demographic details discussed in this chapter, the final
cleaned data from the sample of n=514 is used. The gender analysis indicated an 87.9% female
(N=452) to 12.1% male (N=62) composition, which is roughly consistent with the United States’
nursing population. The United States Department of Labor indicates a 92% to 8% female to
male composition of registered nurses overall nationwide without any differentiation of
education or experience, however, the membership of the National Student Nurses Association
(NSNA) compares favorably with this sample. The education analysis indicates that 71% of
respondents have a baccalaureate degree or higher for (n=365) whereas those with an Associate
degree or diploma (n=142) account for 27.6%. These results are comparable with the results
from other NSNA survey data as well. Those aged 32 or younger (n=345) are roughly double the
representation of their counterparts over the age of 32 (n=169). Those aged 49 or older (n=36)
make up only 7% of the sample. A conceivable explanation for the age make up is that the
intended target for the survey was comprised of nurses who graduated the year prior in an effort
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to limit variation in experience among the sample. Presumably, some of the advanced degree
nurses may have had prior experience, but overall respondents’ reported education type indicates
recent entry into the profession. Degrees generally considered entry points to the profession
(Associates Degree Diploma, Baccalaureate Degree, Accelerated BSN program) make up the
91.4% majority (n=470) of the sample. Race was collected as an NSNA standard demographic
element and displayed as part of the descriptive analysis. At 73.3%, the majority of the
respondents (n=377) reported themselves as Caucasian. The ratio of public-private school type is
comparable to the membership of NSNA with twice as many public school respondents as
private (not for-profit schools) and four times as many public school respondents as private-forprofit schools.
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Table 2 Sample Characteristics
Sample Characteristics
Gender

Degree Type

Age Range

Race

School Type

Frequency

Percent

Male

62

12.1

Female

452

87.9

Total

514

100.0

Other (please specify)

5

1.0

Associates Degree

125

24.3

Diploma

17

3.3

Baccalaureate Degree

243

47.3

Accelerated BSN program

85

16.5

Master’s Degree

9

1.8

Clinical Nurse Leader Masters

5

1.0

Doctorate

1

.2

RN to BSN

22

4.3

Total

512

99.6

Missing

2

.4

≤32

345

67.1

33-48

133

25.9

≥49

36

7.0

Total

514

100.0

Other (please specify)

7

1.4

American Indian or Alaskan Native

3

.6

Asian

38

7.4

Black or African American

35

6.8

Caucasian

377

73.3

Hispanic or Latino

29

5.6

Mixed Race

21

4.1

Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander

1

.2

Total

511

99.4

Missing

3

.6

Other

13

2.5

Public

292

56.8

Private not-for-profit

138

26.8

Private proprietary for-profit

71

13.8

Total

514

100.0
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Phone Characteristics
As the survey instrument pertains to the use of mobile devices among new nurses, the
types of mobile phones used among respondents was collected to texture the study with
descriptive data. This information was collected as free-text entries and tabulated both by
manufacturer and operating system. Please note that the survey collected information about
“personal use of technologies at work and at home.” The survey did not draw a distinction
between hospital-issued and personally-owned devices whether for work on home use. At the
time of this dissertation, the use of personal mobile phones in the workplace for clinical use has
yet to be established commonplace for nurses. In the clinical setting, phone use among nurses is
most commonly limited to voice functionality for communication (Parker, 2014). The
emergence of bring-your-own-device (BYOD) modalities for smart phone features are more
commonly witnessed among non-clinical staff for business purposes.

Table 3 Phone Operating System
Phone Operating System

Frequency

Percent

Android
iOS
Windows

159
389
2

28.91
70.73
0.36

Total

550

100

New nurses tend to use the iOS phone operating system more so than the general
population. According to Gartner, Android had captured 86.1% of the world’s phone market
compared to 13.7% for iOS in the first quarter of 2016 (Reisinger, 2017). Save the two
Windows entries, the phone operating system appears among respondents to be somewhat
inverse to the worldwide prevalence. The sales figures for Apple and Samsung, its major
competitor in the Android marketplace, are tabulated by the respective manufacturers differently
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thereby making the comparison an arduous task. Furthermore, Google’s Android operating
system produces a broad range of device models from a plethora of competitors and even
numerous concurrent offerings from each manufacturer. With even more manufacturers, a
fractured marketplace with an assortment of devices of varying qualities and features is
emerging. Apple on the other hand exclusively supports a single model operating system type
(iOS) on a single line of phone products (iPhone) thereby controlling both the hardware and
software with a single manufacturer.
Apple represents 70.73% of the usage among new nurses. Samsung is the largest
competitor to Apple with their phones using the Android operating system. The results of the
study show Samsung representing 21.64% of the phone usage and represents by far the largest
denomination of manufacturers using Google’s Android operating system.
Table 4 Phone Manufacturers
Phone Manufacturer

Frequency

Percent

Alcatel
Android
Apple
Blackberry
Blu
Google
HTC
LG
Motorola
Nokia
Samsung
Windows Based
ZTE

1
1
389
1
1
12
2
12
8
1
119
1
2

0.18
0.18
70.73
0.18
0.18
2.18
0.36
2.18
1.45
0.18
21.64
0.18
0.36

Total

550

100
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As the information pertaining to individual phone manufacturers was collected as a freetext field, results were at times carefully inferred by various spellings and use of ambiguous
model numbers. The information is provided but any analysis using these data is out of this
study’s scope. One manufacturer was listed as “Windows” with the Blu phone speculatively as
the other possible Windows operated phone making up the two Windows phones from previous
table. Blu has historically made phones with the Windows operating system, but typically
markets lower cost phones operated by Android.
Descriptive Findings of The Study
To answer the main question of the study “How much do new nurses know about security
of information systems and does their knowledge influence their risk behaviors in using mobile
technology?” it is important to first describe the common mobile technology use of the
participants. The first sub-question for the study is as follows:
What kind of activities do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, including
frequency of use, types of activities, and habits or behaviors that may make them
vulnerable to increasing the security risk?
To begin to answer this question, a series of descriptive statistics were performed on
questions about mobile application use and reported practices in securing devices on personal
and hospital devices.
Mobile Application Use
To answer the survey question “What is the reported level and type of new nurse mobile
application use?” a series of descriptive analyses were done on their reported responses in the
table Smart Phone Use By Feature. The category of “very often” received the most responses for
the following features: Text Messaging (N=272), Social Media (N=250), and Web Browsing
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(N=234). An 88.5% majority of respondents (N=455) reported use of social media frequency
between sometimes to very often. Those features that were most often not used include the
following: Chatting (N=94), Online Library (N=90), and Video/Movies (N=50). Very few
respondents declared that features were unavailable; the largest segment include the following:
Online Library (N=14), Chatting (N=8), and Contact List (N=2). Given that all respondents
declared that they use a modern smart phone with the exception of a few ambiguous responses,
the surveyed features should all be available. The exception may be that work-managed phones
may have such features disabled and such differentiation was not determined in the survey. The
Online Library feature, like many others surveyed, is not necessarily a native phone application,
but rather an additional application or website. This feature was declared by the most number as
not being available which may suggest that the question was not understood.
Table 5 Smart Phone Use By Feature
Mobile (Smart Phone)
Usage
Talking
Web Browsing
Chatting
Email
Text Messaging
Multimedia Messaging
Camera
Calendar
Notes
Contact List
Maps/Navigation
Social Media
Music
Video/Movies

Minimal
54
3
73
16
3
28
30
36
75
33
14
19
38
94

Rarely
65
14
87
21
8
60
41
46
105
78
34
27
60
128

Sometimes
195
97
92
144
62
166
166
125
166
193
146
78
125
111

Often
125
161
90
197
166
121
162
166
100
129
184
127
135
75

Very Often
63
234
67
130
272
114
108
136
41
76
128
250
136
54

Do Not Use
11
3
94
3
2
22
6
4
26
3
6
13
20
50

Feature Not Available
1
1
8
0
1
1
1
1
0
2
0
0
0
1

Online Library

104

132

101

38

34

90

14
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Security Practice Results
To answer the survey question about basic security practices, a series of descriptive
statistics were calculated on participants’ reported responses as indicated in the Practice
Reponses table describing the frequencies of basic security practice of locking a device among
new nurses. The survey included a matrix style question to determine how often respondents
lock their phones and other mobile devices which includes both hospital-owned and person
devices. The process of locking a device does not permit usage until subsequent authentication
is validated. Contemporary common methods of validation include a username-password
combination, numerical passcode, password, finger scan, pattern drawing, and facial recognition.
Table 6 Practice Results (By Percentage)
Practices

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Always

Device Not Capable

Not Applicable

Lock Personal Phone
Lock Personal Mobile
Device (Laptop/Tablet)
Lock Hospital-Provided
Phone
Lock Hospital Provided
Mobile Device
(Laptop/Tablet)

10.5

2.3

3.3

4.5

79.0

.2

.2

6.2

4.3

5.3

11.1

68.9

1.6

2.7

4.1

.8

2.5

2.7

16.9

16.9

56.0

1.9

.8

2.1

8.6

23.9

4.5

58.2

The results indicate that the “always” response is prevalent with personal phones and
mobile devices whereas over half of respondents list the same hospital-owned devices as not
applicable for locking. Hospital provided phones and mobile devices are considered as not
applicable 56.0% and 58.2% respectively. A possible explanation for the rate whereby locking is
not applicable may either be related to the lack of hospital-owned devices in use by nurses.
Another possibility is that the prevalence of device and network management systems in hospital
settings may enforce an automatic locking of devices regardless of human intervention.
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The locked personal phones and devices indicate a rate of 83.5% and 70.5% respectively
for those who responded with often and always as a practice. This indicates a high rate of safe
practices among respondents for the security of physical access to their personal devices.
Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors of New Nurses
The main question driving the study can be broken into a series of questions related to the
new nurses’ specific cybersecurity knowledge, risk, and personal characteristics including:
What is the level of new nurses’ knowledge of information system security (KISS), risk
behaviors (RB), concern for information privacy (CFIP), their information privacy protective
responses (IPPR), and how are these affected by their threat appraisal (internal or external) to
themselves, their hospitals, or their patients? Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP) can also
be categorized by factors including:
a.
b.
c.
d.

medical facilities errors (ME)?
unauthorized access to medical information (UA)?
medical facilities secondary use of medical information (SU)?
personal collection of medical information (CO)?

The following variables have been collected on the survey questionnaire as follows. The
CFIP along with subscales, the IPPR, KISS, RB, and threat appraisal are analyzed descriptively
in the following section. The measures developed for this study to measure knowledge and risk
were assessed in the pilot study and psychometrically assessed for reliability again in this study.
Displayed below are the variables with corresponding item numbers from the survey. Following
the declaration of variables is a table displaying a breakdown of the scales and a separate table
for threat appraisal (Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey).
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•

Demographics – Items 1-5

•

CFIP: Concern for Information Privacy – Items 6, 7g-j)

•

Subscales of CFIP:
o UA: Unauthorized Access to Medical Information (6a-c)
o SU: Secondary Use of Medical Information (d-f)
o ME: Medical Facility Errors (g-i)
o CO: Personal Collection of Medical Information (7g-j)

•

IPPR: Information Privacy Protective Responses, a response to the CFIP – Item 7 (c-h),
Items 7a-b omitted to elevate the coefficient alpha=.758 based on 4 items.

•

Personal Use of Mobile Devices Items 8-11

•

Personal Technology Practices – Items 12-15

•

Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS) – Items 18 -44

•

Risk Behaviors (RB) Score – Items 17

•

Threat appraisal (Internal and External) – Item 45
Level of Knowledge
What is the level of new nurses’ knowledge of information system security (KISS)

related to patient privacy, security rules, and vulnerability to breaches or threats to exposing
protected health information (PHI)?
The tables Knowledge Score Descriptive Statistics and Knowledge Results for
instrument element-specific results. The Knowledge Score Frequency Chart displays the
frequency distribution.
Table 7 Knowledge Score Descriptive Statistics

Knowledge
Score

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

514

0.33

1

0.8297

0.10667
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The KISS scores overall show an average of 82.97% correct results. Within the KISS
instrument are a few items with results diverging noticeably from the overall instrument mean
score.
The knowledge item pertaining to the right to access a relative/spouse/partner/friend’s
electronic health information (Item 4) is the second lowest result in correct responses at 42.2%.
Note that the questions are displayed in their entirety in the table with the ellipses completed by
the multiple choice answers. The complete knowledge instrument with all response options and
indicators for correct responses can be viewed in Appendix H - Content Validity: Student
Nurses’ Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors.
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Table 8 Knowledge Results
Percent
Correct
92.8
88.7
75.5
42.2
99.0
95.7
64.2
60.5
96.1

Item Number

Question

Knowledge 1
Knowledge 2
Knowledge 3
Knowledge 4
Knowledge 5
Knowledge 6
Knowledge 7
Knowledge 8
Knowledge 9

Putting patient information on a USB drive is acceptable if….
Texting patient information is acceptable if….
Placing patient information on my personal computer is acceptable if….
I may access my relative/spouse/partner/friend’s electronic health information if….
If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s chart…
If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I….
If I discover a coworker has accessed their relative’s information, I…
If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my password, I….
I can put patient data on a USB stick if….

Knowledge 10

If a website informs me that JAVA must be updated, I….
If a computer message from the FBI states my files have been scrambled and I must pay a
$300 fine, I…
If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and requests a wire transfer, I….
An email from my bank states my account had been compromised and I must verify my
identity by clicking on a link and filling out some information, I….
My coworker received a strange email from me requesting money, I….
A well-known national realtor sends an email with the subject “Hot Properties in Your
Neighborhood." The link requests a Gmail or Yahoo login to proceed. Assuming there’s
an interest, I….
The corner deli that typically delivers lunch complains they received a fax with patient
information, I….
When leaving a computer logged in with my password, I….
A pop-up appears informing me the computer is running slow, I….
Taking patient or chart photos with my own cell phone is acceptable if….
A person without a hospital badge states he is from IT and needs me to login for him to fix
the slowness problem, I….
I may work with documents containing patient information on my home computer or
laptop….
If I need to look at my health records, I….

73.3

If a law firm requests patient information, I….
If a standard computer without encryption has a sensitive file that is purposefully
deleted…
It’s acceptable to backup patient information to my personal cloud (Google Drive,
Dropbox, iCloud, etc...) for safekeeping...
If my coworker suspects someone must have looked at his/her health record due to gossip
about his/her condition, I would…
If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing sensitive information, I…

98.8

Knowledge 11
Knowledge 12
Knowledge 13
Knowledge 14
Knowledge 15
Knowledge 16
Knowledge 17
Knowledge 18
Knowledge 19
Knowledge 20
Knowledge 21
Knowledge 22
Knowledge 23
Knowledge 24
Knowledge 25
Knowledge 26
Knowledge 27

88.7
99.6
99.4
65.8
27.4
80.4
97.9
69.5
84.6
94.2
91.6
90.7
84.4
96.5
89.1
93.6

78

The knowledge scores displayed in the graph below shows a slightly skewed frequency
distribution of respondents tending to score in the higher end range according to the Knowledge
Score Frequency Chart. While outlying scores exist in the lower range, this graph suggests that
new nurses one-year tend to have a homogenous knowledge of information system security
generally speaking. Given that nursing schools are responsible for at least some training to
prepare students for hospital experiences, it is a reasonable expectation that the shape of the
curve reflects how tests might be graded with the mean, median and mode around a grade of B.
No inference of knowledge related to information system security is however presumed but
rather the curve is akin to school test score distributions.

Figure 9 Knowledge Score Frequency Chart
Level of Risk
What is the level of risk behavior of nurses and types of risk behaviors related to their use
of mobile devices?
The Risk Behavior Score Descriptive Statistics table shows the instrument elementspecific results. With an n=154, the mean risk behavior score is 68.86 with a standard deviation
of 9.348.
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Table 9 Risk Behavior Score Descriptive Statistics

Risk Score

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

514

46

145

68.86

9.348

The Risk Behavior scores overall show a mapping of the behavior frequency among new
nurses. Within the Risk Behaviors’ elements are results that stand out as items for discussion.
An overwhelming 94.9% of new nurses do not send patient information via personal
email. That leaves 3.6% of new nurse, who in varying levels of frequency, would send patient
information via email. Note that purpose for using personal email to send PHI was not asked. To
some degree 18.9% of participants obtain content outside of legitimate sources.
Security modalities such as antivirus and firewalls are not used by 41.4% of new nurses.
One plausible explanation is that security modalities tend to have historically been more in
commonplace usage with desktops and laptops than the prolific mobile devices such as phones
and tables. Speculatively, these may not be used among respondents with their laptop use, but
this has not been asked in such a granular fashion.
In the reported behaviors, it would appear that financial data breaches occurred in 30% of
new nurses. Conversely, only 27.4% of new nurses recognized the phishing attack from the
knowledge survey. The question did not offer any determination as to how the data may have
been breached or to what degree. The data suggests that new nurses may lack knowledge of key
areas of common attack by nefarious agents, do not employ protective security modalities by and
large, and many may have already suffered data breaches with financial implications by the time
they embarked on their career.
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Table 10 Risk Behaviors Results
Risk Behaviors

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Always

I accept social media invitations for applications.
I shop on the Internet.
I use Facebook, Twitter and similar social network sites.
I download/save music, movies, programs and files from the Internet.
I share my contact information on the Internet when required.
I use security programs like anti-virus, spyware removal, firewall, etc.
I delete the temporary files and Internet history before leaving a public
computer.
I password protect my files.
I use complex and long passwords that cannot be easily guessed.
I change my passwords periodically.
I share my passwords with others.
I transfer (send or receive) files while I chat.
I use passwords when turning on all of my devices.
…“jailbreak”, or use a customized environment to get free apps.
…click on email links to reset my password.
…use free Wi-Fi at public locations such as cafes and airports.
…keep my device attended and in my possession.
…text patient information with colleagues (aside from corporate
applications).
…use personal email containing patient information.
…accept invitations for games and apps through social networks.
…download movies/music/apps by pirating or otherwise without
paying (aside from legit streaming services).
…share my password (any) with others such as family, friends, or
coworkers
…use autofill to complete my information in websites.
…submit my personal information such as name, address, phone
number, and credit card info into websites when requested.
…chat with strangers online.
…post personal information on social media sites.
…have had my financial/credit information personally breached (aside
from publicized breaches of corporations).
…have had my passwords stolen/misused. (Evident by unauthorized
emails/posts or services accessed by unauthorized entities)
…chat with others about patient information outside of work.

35.8
.6
3.7
14.0
8.0
41.4

30.0
6.2
6.0
30.9
28.8
18.9

23.9
41.4
18.3
28.4
43.0
19.8

4.1
43.0
44.0
21.0
16.9
9.9

1.2
8.6
27.8
5.1
2.9
6.4

24.1

13.6

17.7

17.7

13.8

24.3
41.8
19.5
68.1
38.7
52.1
83.9
32.3
3.5
74.9

15.6
29.6
26.1
25.5
29.6
20.4
7.4
17.5
22.4
20.4

23.0
21.6
31.5
5.1
18.9
15.0
2.1
35.0
45.1
2.9

17.5
4.1
15.8
.6
5.3
6.0
.8
10.7
22.4
1.0

17.5
2.7
7.0
.2
2.1
5.3
.2
3.3
6.6
.6

84.4

8.8

3.1

1.0

.8

94.9
66.9

1.8
21.0

.8
9.3

.8
1.2

.2
.4

80.4

12.1

6.0

.4

.4

68.1

23.9

6.2

1.2

.6

12.8

21.0

43.8

18.1

4.1

11.7

23.0

43.4

19.1

2.7

85.8
45.7

11.1
36.0

2.1
13.6

.8
3.9

.2
.6

69.3

21.8

7.0

1.0

.2

75.3

18.5

4.1

.2

.4

79.0

13.6

5.4

.6

.2
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The risk behavior score frequency in the graph below shows an approximately normal
distribution around the mean. While outlying scores exist in the higher range, this graph
suggests that new nurses tend to have a relatively even distribution of knowledge of risk
behaviors with most falling in the medium risk range.

Figure 10 Risk Habit Score Frequency Distribution
Information Privacy Protection Responses and Concern For Information Privacy
What is the level of new nurses’ Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) and
Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) factors?
The survey questions to capture measures for Concern for Information Privacy and
Information Privacy Protective Responses were developed from an original questionnaire by
Kuo, Ma, and Alexander (2014) and modified to capture new nurses’ responses to the items as
they would pertain to themselves rather than patients’ responses. These new variables were
tested for feasibility and reliability in the pilot study and reported in Chapter 3. The items were
reduced following a careful assessment of the item analyses and the items were captured on the
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full study. A descriptive analysis was done on the CFIP total scale and the 4 subscales as
described by Kuo et al. (2014) and reported in the CFIP and IPPR Descriptive Statistics table.

Table 11 CFIP and IPPR Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Total CFIP AU

513

6

18

11.56

2.463

Total CFIP SU

514

3

18

13.63

1.957

Total CFIP ER

510

6

18

11.60

2.302

Total CFIP CO

510

4

22

10.52

3.867

Total CFIP

505

28

65

47.35

6.861

Total IPPR

512

4

24

15.93

2.997

Reliability of All Measurement Scales
The instrument reliability for all the study scales were assessed and reported in the
Instrument Reliability table (Table 12), showing the Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate for both
the pilot (n=167) and current nationwide study (n=514). The reliability goal was to have a
Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .70 or greater for each instrument. While elements from
the pilot study original questionnaire were dropped to achieve this goal, remaining elements of
the current nationwide study were left intact. All elements except the knowledge instrument
attained the goal with KISS having a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .669. The
determination to leave the knowledge score intact was made following analysis indicating that an
incremental reduction of elements within the scale would yield a diminishing minute increase in
the Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate. The IPPR scale had two items removed to achieve a
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Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .758. Variables were used in the study included the full
scale of the Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP), 4 of the 6 items in the Information Personal
Protective Response (IPPR), the four subscales for the Concern for Information Privacy (AU=
Unauthorized Access; SU=Secondary Use; ME=Medical Errors; CO=Personal Collection of
Medical Information), Knowledge of Information Security Systems (KISS) and the Risk
Behaviors (RB).

Table 12 Instrument Reliability - Pilot and Current Study
Instrument Reliability - Cronbach's Alpha
Instrument

Pilot Study

Current Study

CFIP
CFIP_AU
CFIP_SU
CFIP_ME
CFIP_CO
IPPR
RB (Risk)

0.890
0.861
0.883
0.875
0.887
0.704
0.728

0.800
0.810
0.771
0.746
0.883
0.758
0.715

KISS (Knowledge)

0.775

0.669

Reported Threat Appraisal – “Worry” About a Consequence – Ranked Groups
The survey asked respondents to rank in order from 1-4 statements that indicated
consequences that they would “worry about” as a result in a security breach. These ranking were
used to determine the level of threat by the respondents related to internal harm (threat to
themselves) or external harm vis-à-vis harm related to external entities (threats to others). The
question was: Which of the following statements reflects your motivation to keep your patient
information on the EHR secure? Rank order from lowest (least worry) to highest (most worry) (1
to 4).
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Table 13 Threat Appraisal Taxonomy
___ I would worry about fines on me or my loss of position.
INTERNAL THREATS

___ I would worry about my loss of employment.
___ I would worry that my patients’ privacy would be exposed.

EXTERNAL THREATS

___ I would worry that my hospital would be fined.

The ranked groups for each of the threats were identified and used in subsequent analyses
to test if the group of individuals who ranked a particular threat (internal or external) at a
particular similar level (lowest threat group to highest threat group). These can be used to
interpret variables associated with those groups who considered “internal threats” highest or
lowest and/or “external threats” highest or lowest with each threat serving as an independent
variable to test knowledge, risk, concern for information protection and information protective
responses.

Table 14 Threat Rankings – Frequency of The Responses
Worry/Threat
Fines on me or loss of position
Loss of employment
Patient privacy exposed
Hospital would be fined

Order of Threat (Higher = More Threat)
1

2

3

4

52
77
89
275

182
126
151
30

164
162
135
32

86
128
120
162
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Hypothesis Testing: Knowledge, Concern for Information Privacy, Information Privacy
Protective Responses, Risk Behaviors, and Threat Appraisal
To test the second part of the sub-question: “How are knowledge, risk, concern and
protective responses related and affected by their threat appraisal (internal or external) to
themselves, their hospitals, or their patients?” several hypotheses were developed.
The following questions were further specified to use in testing relationships among the
variables of interest and differences that might be affected by threat appraisal. These are used to
organize the results reported.
Question: Is Knowledge a Predictor of Risk and Concern for Information Privacy Total and
Factors?
The following are hypotheses associated with the research question:
1. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
2. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an
increase in Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP).
3. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an
increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors (ME).
4. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an
increase in Concern for unauthorized access to medical information (UA)?
5. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an
increase in Concern for medical facilities secondary use of medical information
(SU)?
6. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an
increase in Concern for personal collection of medical information (CO)?
7. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an
increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR).

86

Knowledge Related To Risk
To test the hypotheses, the data were analyzed statistically using SPSS Version 23. The
following table shows the correlation analysis of the Risk Behaviors (RB) and Knowledge of
Information System Security (KISS). With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to
determine significance at the p ≤ .05 level.

Table 15 Risk Behaviors Related To Knowledge
Correlations
Knowledge
Score

Knowledge Score

Risk Behaviors Score

1

-.110*

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Risk Behaviors
Score

Pearson
Correlation

.013
514

514

-.110*

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.013

N

514

514

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The correlation between knowledge and risk behaviors among new nurses is statistically
significant with a Pearson’s Correlation of r = -.110 (p ≤ .05). This two-tailed test indicates that
knowledge is inversely related to risk. In other words, those with a high level of knowledge
related to the information security of mobile devices have a lower risk associated with their
mobile device habits.
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Knowledge Related To Concern For Information Privacy
The following table shows the correlation analysis of the Concern For Information
Privacy (CFIP), Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR), and Knowledge of
Information System Security (KISS). With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to
determine significance at the p ≤ .05 level.
Table 16 Knowledge related to CFIP and IPPR
Correlations
Knowledge Score
Knowledge
Score

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

1

N
514
Pearson Correlation
0.037
0.411
Total CFIP Sig. (2-tailed)
N
505
Pearson Correlation
0.072
0.102
Total IPPR Sig. (2-tailed)
N
514
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The correlation between knowledge and participants’ CFIP and the IPPR among new
nurses are not statistically significant (p=NS) with a Pearson’s Correlation of r = .037 (p=NS)
and r = .072 (p=NS) (Table 16). Although the CFIP is correlated with the IPPR (r = .414, p<.05)
(see Table 17), which was expected as the study by Kuo, Ma and Alexander (2014) identified the
factors of concern for information privacy (CFIP) converging on participants’ individual
personal protective responses (IPPR). These, however, have no connection to knowledge.
These findings indicate a likelihood among new nurses with an increasing rate of CFIP to
have an increase in their personal protection responses. However, knowledge is neither
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correlated with the CFIP nor the IPPR. The CFIP items are related to the concern for the
information privacy of the patient whereas the IPPR relates to the protective responses related to
the information privacy of the nurse. Speculatively, these results could infer a correlation in
nurses’ disposition of information privacy between the patients and themselves regardless of the
level of information security knowledge related to mobile devices.
Question: Are Risk Behaviors Related to Concern for Information Privacy Total and Factors?
The following are hypotheses associated with the research question:
1. Hypothesis: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
2. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
3. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors (ME) results in a
decrease in identified risk behaviors.
4. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical
Information (UA) results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
5. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information
(SU) results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
6. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical
Information (CO) results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
7. Hypothesis: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR)
results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors.
The Risk Behaviors related CFIP and IPPR table shows the correlation analysis of the
Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP), Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR), and
Risk Behaviors (RB). With an N=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to determine
significance at the p ≤ .05 level.
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Table 17 Risk Behaviors related to CFIP and IPPR
Correlations
Total Risk Behaviors
Risk Behaviors

Total CFIP

.116**

.003

.008

514

505

514

**

1

.412**

Pearson Correlation

1

.132

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Total CFIP

Total IPPR

Pearson Correlation

Total IPPR
**

.132

Sig. (2-tailed)

.003

N

505

505

505

**

**

1

Pearson Correlation

.116

.000
.412

Sig. (2-tailed)

.008

.000

N

514

505

514

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The correlation between risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR among new nurses is statistically
significant. Risk behaviors shows a positive correlation with CFIP and IPPR with Pearson’s
Correlation values of r = .132 and r = .116 respectively at the p ≤ .01 level. With a Pearson’s
Correlation of r = .412 at the p ≤ .01 level, CFIP and IPPR are more strongly related to one
another than risk is related to either, however, this was expected as the study by Kuo, Ma and
Alexander (2014) identified the factors of concern for information privacy (CFIP) converging on
participants’ individual personal protective responses (IPPR). This two-tailed test indicates that
in this modified version of the questionnaire of the nurses’ responses about concern for
information privacy and information privacy protective responses are directly related to one
another with a stronger correlation than that of risk behaviors. Although informative, this was
not the hypothesis to be tested, and in fact, significant in the opposite direction. This suggests
that it may be associated with how the risk behaviors interact with the concerns for privacy and
protective responses, which were hypothesized to be inversely correlated with risk.
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The hypotheses suggesting a relationship between CFIP, IPPR and risk behaviors were
predicted to be inversely correlated. The findings demonstrated an increase in risk behaviors is
associated with increases in the CFIP and IPPR. Therefore, new nurses tend to have increased
concern for their patients’ information privacy and their own protective responses as their own
level of risk behaviors increase. This was not expected and runs counterintuitive to industry
notions, with a prediction that one’s concern would decrease one’s risk behaviors. What might be
evident is that participants’ risk behaviors make them more suspicious of information protection
privacy and more likely to select stronger protective responses – thus, yielding an inverse
relationship – and suggesting that risk influences concern and protective responses, rather than
concern and protective responses influences risk. With only a correlation analysis, this logic
cannot be tested, and the model proposed may need to be modified.
Question: Is Threat Appraisal Associated with Knowledge, Risk, Concern for Information
Privacy Total and Factors, and Personal Protective Responses?
To compare the knowledge, risk, concern and protective response mean scores by threat
appraisal groups, two general null hypotheses were developed:

Internal Null Hypotheses: Internal threats are not associated with knowledge, risk, concerns
or protective responses.

External Null Hypotheses: External threats are not associated with knowledge, risk,
concerns or protective responses.
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Threat – Internal and External
The survey instrument contained four statements, two developed to reflect “internal”
threats (i.e. threat to self, such as fine, loss of position or job) and “external” threats (i.e. threat to
others such as hospital fines, patient privacy breached). Participants were asked to rank order
them from “lowest threat/worry” to “highest threat/worry” that yielded four groups of threat
assessments for each threat. These threat groups were used to test for differences in mean scores
on the variables of interest including knowledge, risk, concern and protective responses.
The results yielded four groups indicating from least to most worrisome that a breach event
could cause an impact to the nurse (internal) such as a personal threat (job, position) or that a
breach event could cause an impact to others (external) vis-à-vis an impact to either the patient or
hospital (external).
Threat of Nurse Fine
The following table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors,
CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of fines (internal threat). With an n=514, an
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed.
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Table 18 Threat of fine ranks on differences in knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
Knowledge
Score
Risk Behaviors

Total IPPR

Total CFIP

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.124

3

.041

Within Groups

5.337

480

.011

Total

5.461

483

351.794

3

117.265

Within Groups

41195.386

480

85.824

Total

41547.180

483

35.687

3

11.896

Within Groups

4433.575

480

9.237

Total

4469.262

483

155.819

3

51.940

Within Groups

22124.294

473

46.774

Total

22280.113

476

Between Groups

Between Groups

Between Groups

F

Sig.

3.721

.011

1.366

.252

1.288

.278

1.110

.344

The ANOVA indicates a statistically significant difference for knowledge scores by the
threat groups for fines (internal threat) between knowledge and the worry about fines among new
nurses (F = 3.72, df=3,480, p<.05). No other significant differences exist with the threat levels
of fines and risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP.

Table 19 Threat of fine level related to knowledge scores
Knowledge Score
Fines on me or loss of position
1
2
3
4
Total

Mean
.82
.85
.83
.81
.83

N
52
182
164
86
484

Std. Deviation
.087
.099
.106
.125
.106
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An analysis of knowledge mean score by highest threat ranking indicates that with a
mean score of .81, those indicating the highest threat of fine have the lowest knowledge score.
Threat of Job Loss
The following table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors,
CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of job loss (internal threat). With an n=514, an
ANOVA was performed.

Table 20 Threat of job loss ranks on differences in knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
Knowledge
Score
Risk Score

Total IPPR

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.016

3

.005

Within Groups

5.340

489

.011

Total

5.356

492

222.435

3

74.145

Within Groups

35855.362

489

73.324

Total

36077.797

492

1.125

3

.375

Within Groups

4464.124

489

9.129

Total

4465.249

492

65.306

3

21.769

22330.786

482

46.329

22396.093

485

Between Groups

Between Groups

Total CFIP
Between Groups
(AU/SU/ERCO) Within Groups
Total

F

Sig.

.499

.683

1.011

.387

.041

.989

.470

.703
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The ANOVA indicates that there are no differences among mean scores for knowledge,
risk behaviors, CFIP and IPPR with the threat ranking of threat of job loss (internal).
Threat To Patient Privacy
The Threat to patient privacy table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge,
risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of patient privacy breaches
(external threat). With an n=514, an ANOVA was performed.

Table 21 Threat to patient privacy related to knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
Knowledge
Score
Risk Score

Total IPPR

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.079

3

.026

Within Groups

5.311

491

.011

Total

5.390

494

46.863

3

15.621

Within Groups

36601.128

491

74.544

Total

36647.992

494

32.808

3

10.936

Within Groups

4279.374

491

8.716

Total

4312.182

494

98.849

3

32.950

21984.624

484

45.423

22083.473

487

Between Groups

Between Groups

Total CFIP
Between Groups
(AU/SU/ERCO) Within Groups
Total

F

Sig.

2.443

.063

.210

.890

1.255

.289

.725

.537

The ANOVA indicates that there are no differences among mean scores for knowledge,
risk behaviors, CFIP and IPPR with the threat ranking of patient privacy (external threat) in new
nurses. It is important to note, however, that with the knowledge mean score comparisons
suggesting potential differences by threat ranking (F = 3.443, df=3,491, p=.063), it would be
prudent to follow up on this variable in future studies.
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Threat of Hospital Fine
The following table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors,
CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of hospital fines (external threat). With an
n=514, an ANOVA was performed.

Table 22 Threat of hospital fine related to knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
Knowledge
Score
Total Habit

Total IPPR

Total CFIP

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.008

3

.003

Within Groups

5.447

495

.011

Total

5.455

498

224.496

3

74.832

Within Groups

36873.071

495

74.491

Total

37097.567

498

13.488

3

4.496

Within Groups

4452.769

495

8.995

Total

4466.257

498

89.059

3

29.686

Within Groups

22348.866

488

45.797

Total

22437.925

491

Between Groups

Between Groups

Between Groups

F

Sig.

.230

.876

1.005

.390

.500

.683

.648

.584

The ANOVA indicates no significant differences among mean scores for knowledge, risk
behaviors, CFIP and IPPR with the threat ranking of patient privacy threat in new nurses.
In summary, the hypotheses related to the main variables of interest, knowledge, risk,
concern for privacy, personal protective responses and threat appraisal yielded some statistically
significant findings. Of note is that knowledge and risk are correlated in the direction predicted:
as knowledge of participants increased, risk behaviors decreased. While knowledge and risk
were significantly related, knowledge was not related to concern for information privacy or
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personal protective responses. Risk, however, was related to concern for information privacy and
personal protective responses but not in the direction predicted. What is suggested by the results
is that new nurses’ risk behaviors influence their concern and protective responses directly – that
perhaps those who take more risks are more concerned and are likely to engage in more personal
protective responses. Finally, ranked groups of the internal threat appraisal for fines or loss of
position did appear to affect participants’ knowledge, but not risk behaviors, concern or personal
protective responses. The highest threat ranking for personal fine (internal) was associated with
the lowest knowledge score. The null hypotheses were not rejected for any other threat appraisal
ranking differences in mean scores for the variables of interest: knowledge, risk, concern or
personal protective responses.
Hypothesis Testing: Demographic Variables
Is knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses influenced by select demographic
characteristics such as gender, age and education (program type or school type)?
Differences in Knowledge, Risk, and Concern for Information Privacy and Protective Responses
The following sections will present the results testing the hypotheses generated around
these questions. They will include variables about the nurses (i.e. gender, age, school type) as
they may or may not influence the variables in the study including:
(1) Do men and women differ in their knowledge and risk behaviors related to
cybersecurity?
(2) Do men and women differ in their reported mobile device practices?
(3) Does the age of nurses differ on their scores for knowledge, risk behaviors, threat
appraisal, or concern for information protection?
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(4) Does nursing education type or school type affect knowledge, risk behaviors, threat
appraisal, or concern for information protection?
Gender Related to Knowledge, Risk Behaviors and Reported Mobile Device Practice
To test the hypotheses that the study variables of knowledge, risk, concern or protective
responses and mobile device practices differ by gender, a t test was performed on study variables
with no significant differences (p=NS) for KISS, RS, CFIP or IPPR, and no significant
correlations for frequency of mobile device use for any study items (p=NS).
Age Related To Knowledge, Risk Behaviors
To test the hypotheses if age and study variables are associated, the age of participants
was collapsed into three categories to correct for multiple age ranges selected by participants.
These became three age ranges: Younger Age Range (ages <30); Middle age range (ages 30 to
45); Older age range (ages >45).
The following table shows the correlation analysis of age range, knowledge of
information security systems (KISS), and Risk Behaviors (RB), concern (CFIP) and personal
protective responses (IPPR). With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to
determine significance at both the p ≤ .01 and p ≤ .05 levels.
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Table 23 Age related to knowledge, risk, concern and personal protective responses
Age Range
Age Range

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Knowledge
Score
Total Risk

CFIP

IPPR

Pearson Correlation

514
.124**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.005

N

514

Pearson Correlation

-.078

Sig. (2-tailed)

.079

N

514

Pearson Correlation

-.023

Sig. (2-tailed)

.601

N

505

Pearson Correlation

-.099*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.025

N

512

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The correlations between age range and knowledge as well as age range with personal
protective response are significant, but age is not significant for risk (RB) or age for concern
(CFIP). Age range shows a positive correlation for knowledge (KISS) with a Pearson’s
Correlation value of .124 significant at the p ≤ .01 level and a negative value of -.099 for
personal protective responses (IPPR) significant at the p<.05 level. These results indicate that
older nurses have high level of knowledge of information system security and are less
“protective” in their responses to using information technology. Neither risk nor concern are
related.
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Age Related To Time Spent Using Mobile Device
The following table shows the correlation analysis of age range and time spent using a
mobile device. With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to determine significance
at the p ≤ .01 level.

Table 24 Age related to time spent using mobile device
Correlations
Age Range
Age Range

Pearson Correlation

Time Spent
1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-.121**
.006

514

513

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between age range and time spent using a mobile device among new nurses
has been determined to be significant. Age range shows a negative correlation with mobile
device usage with Pearson’s Correlation value of r = -.121 (p ≤ .01). This two-tailed test
indicates that the younger age range tends to spend more time using mobile devices.
Age Related To Activity Type
The following table shows the correlation analysis of age range and types of mobile
device activities. With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to determine
significance at both the p ≤ .01 and p ≤ .05 levels.
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Table 25 Age activity for significant correlations
Correlations

Age
Range

Web

IM

Text

MMS

Camera

Notes

Navigation

Social
Media

Music

Pearson
Correlation

-.149**

-.106*

-.131**

-.119**

-.116**

-.095*

-.103*

-.202**

-.147**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.001

.017

.003

.007

.009

.031

.020

.000

.001

512

514

513

512

514

514

N
513
511
514
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 26 Age activity for non-significant correlations

Age
Range

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

Talking

Email

Calendar

Contact List

Video/Movies

Online Library

.019

-.032

-.029

.071

-.029

-.013

.673

.473

.510

.105

.513

.768

514

511

514

514

513

513

All significantly correlated activities are inversely related to age. Therefore, the younger
age group of new nurses have more mobile device activity related the use of web browsing,
instant messaging (IM), multimedia messaging (MMS), camera, notes, navigation, social media,
and music. Social medial has the strongest negative Pearson’s Correlation value at -.202. Those
activities not significantly correlated to age include talking by voice, email, calendar, contact list,
video/movies, and the online library.
Education Related To Knowledge, Risk Behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR
Since the results of the study will be important to inform nursing education practice in
was important to test for differences among types of nursing programs and to test for differences
in types of schools (public, private not-for-profit, private for-profit).
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To test the hypotheses that knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses differ by
types of programs (i.e. Associate Degree, Diploma, Baccalaureate Degree, Masters, etc. Other)
an analysis of variance was done to compare mean scores for the education groups.
The following table shows the results of education differences in knowledge, risk
behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR. With an n=514, an ANOVA was performed.

Table 27 Education type effects on knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
Knowledge
Score
Risk Behaviors

Total IPPR

Total CFIP

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.098

8

.012

Within Groups

5.714

503

.011

Total

5.812

511

883.638

8

110.455

Within Groups

43880.362

503

87.237

Total

44764.000

511

113.408

8

14.176

Within Groups

4457.199

503

8.861

Total

4570.607

511

551.916

8

68.990

Within Groups

23106.231

494

46.774

Total

23658.147

502

Between Groups

Between Groups

Between Groups

F

Sig.

1.084

.373

1.266

.259

1.600

.122

1.475

.164

The ANOVA analysis indicates that that no significant difference exists in new nurses in
their knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, or CFIP related to their type of education program.
Students enrolled in Associates, Baccalaureate and Master’s degree programs did not differ on
these variables related to security and privacy using mobile devices.
To test if the types of schools (public, private not-for-profit, private for-profit) has an
effect on the knowledge, risk, concern and protective responses of new nurses, analysis of
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variance of the mean scores were calculated. The following table shows the results of the
ANOVA on school type comparisons of knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR.

Table 28 School type effects on knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
Knowledge
Score
Total Risk

Total IPPR

Total CFIP

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.043

3

.014

Within Groups

5.794

510

.011

Total

5.838

513

139.946

3

46.649

Within Groups

44685.969

510

87.620

Total

44825.914

513

9.533

3

3.178

Within Groups

4580.803

510

8.982

Total

4590.337

513

184.431

3

61.477

Within Groups

23543.925

501

46.994

Total

23728.356

504

Between Groups

Between Groups

Between Groups

F

Sig.

1.267

.285

.532

.660

.354

.786

1.308

.271

The ANOVA analysis indicates that that no significant difference exists in new nurses in
their knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, or CFIP related to their type of schools, public, private
not for-profit and private for-profit.
Conclusion
In summary, the hypotheses related to demographics yielded some statistically significant
findings. Of note is that gender made no difference on any of the study variables of knowledge,
risk, concern or personal protective responses. Age had a significant influence on types of mobile
device activities as well as participants’ knowledge but not risk behaviors. Age was also
inversely related to personal protective responses, suggesting that older nurses were less likely to
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use personal protection responses. Types of nursing programs and types of schools did not affect
any of the study variables. These findings suggest important considerations when addressing
overall findings of the study as they relate to recommendations for practice.
In summary, the following conclusions can be made from the analyses in the study:
1. Based upon the aforementioned results, the following variables are related:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Knowledge and risk are inversely related.
CFIP is directly related to IPPR.
Risk behavior is directly related to both the CFIP and IPPR.
Age is inversely related to time spent using mobile devices.
Age is inverse related to the following mobile activities: Web, IM, Text, MMS, Camera,
Notes, Navigation, Social Media, and Music.
Age is directly related to knowledge.
Age is inversely related to IPPR.
Threat of nurse fine (internal) and knowledge are related.

2. Based upon the aforementioned results, the following variables are not related:
•
•
•
•
•

Knowledge is related neither to CFIP nor to IPPR.
Threat of nurse fine (internal) is not related to risk behaviors (RB), CFIP, or IPPR.
Threat of job loss (internal) not related to core variables.
Threat to patient privacy (external) not related to core variables (however knowledge
p=.06 and suggests further exploration that may be warranted)
Threat of hospital fine (external) not related to core variables.

3. Based upon the aforementioned results, the following demographic variables are not related:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Gender is not related to any core variables.
Age is not related to CFIP.
Age is not related to risk behavior.
Age is not related to the following mobile activities: Talking, Email, Calendar, Contact
List, Video/Movies, and Online Library.
Type of education is not related to any core variables.
Type of school is not related to any core variables.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction
This chapter presents an organized discussion on the study findings, implications,
measurement instruments, and limitations. The overall intent of this study was to explore the
information security knowledge, risk behavior in the use of portable electronic devices, the
concern for and protective response related to protecting patient information, and the threat
appraisal of consequences for security breaches in a sample of new nurses from across the nation
who had graduated approximately one year prior, thereby sharing a common length of time in the
role of nurse and similar nursing education completion dates. The sample also shared in their
membership of the National Student Nurses Association (NSNA) and its associated nursing
student educational programs and assistance. With respect to experience, this sample of nurses
was homogenous in order to be able to inform educators, both within the educational institution
and the workplace, as to factors examined herein this study. These recommendations are also
discussed, along with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.
Characteristics and Demographics
The survey elements related to demographics consisted of the standard used in prior
NSNA surveys. As the NSNA administered the delivery of the instrument to its members who
agreed to correspondence for survey purposes, consistency with their standard demographic
elements was a requirement. This requirement is the basis for the manner in which the
demographic elements as drafted instead of other standards, including those stock elements from
SurveyMonkey® itself.
Gender data collected for analysis was determined to be congruent with the gender
demographic makeup of the overall population of nurses in the United States. A 92% female to
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8% male composition accounts for the gender of nurses in the United States (United States
Department of Labor, 2015). These gender related statistics did not contain granular information
as to experience, age, or other demographic information collected in this study. Therefore, these
national statistics may be considered generally harmonious and consistent with the study sample
which had an 87.9% female to 12.1% male composition with a sample population of N=541.
This gender makeup, although slightly higher for male responders perhaps based on a higher
likelihood to answer a computer-related survey, also does align with membership of the NSNA
among its reported 60,000 members from across the nation.
The gender demographic was analyzed against all of the core variables; KISS, CFIP,
IPPR, RB, and Threat Appraisal. Of note is that no significant relation has been found between
gender and any of the core variables. This should inform educators, both in nursing education
and in the workplace, of the homogenous nature of nurses respective to gender related to both
knowledge and risk behavior associated with mobile devices.
Consistent with NSNA survey elements, race was one of the collected data elements.
The majority of respondents at 73.3% reported themselves as Caucasian. With low representation
among certain categories such a Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander having a single
representative, analysis with respect to race would not likely be informative. The descriptive
data are reported for information but not tested in the core analyses.
The data related to age included an expansive range with some groups too small for
separating out. After collection, the NSNA-defined age categories were collapsed into the three
sections of those aged 32 and younger, 33 to 48, as well as 49 and older. The rationale for
selecting three groups was to explore general inferences about age related to the other core
variables. The specific values were selected based upon the age range standards for NSNA-
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administered surveys. Specific age values were not collected, only ranges that were collapsed
into three general categories for analysis.
As anticipated with new nurses, the majority (71%) fell into 32 and younger section
whereas a small section (7%) fell into the 49 and older category. As only age ranges were
collected in lieu of actual ages, the ability to determine cutoff points for age ranges was limited
to those range numbers already in use. Hence, the values ≤32 (younger nurses), 33-48 (mid-age
nurses), and ≥49 (older nurses) were designated as the age groups consolidated for analysis and
not suggesting their experience since they were all one-year post graduation.
By separating the respondents into three age groups, this survey has been able to
demonstrate associations with age range and the other factors. Among the most prominent of
findings was the positive association with age and knowledge of information security related to
mobile devices. Counter to the narrative that younger populations have a propensity toward
technology as digital natives, the security knowledge was found to increase with those in the
older age range. Congruent with the digital native narrative associated with younger
populations, this study did find that the inverse association between age range and the use of
mobile electronic devices. Not only did the younger group tend to use their devices more often,
but also the duration of different types of activities or mobile device features varied among the
age groups. Mobile device features such as web, instant/text/multimedia messaging, camera,
notes, navigation, social media, and music tended to be used with a longer duration among the
younger age group.
The younger group of those aged 32 and younger accounted for just over double those in
the other age groups combined. With only 7% of the sample at age 49 and older, the survey was
most represented by the younger nurses. A plausible explanation for the age makeup of the
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sample is that an effort to limit variation in experience was done by surveying NSNA members
who had graduated from a nursing program roughly one year prior. Moreover, as the sample
consisted of mainly nurses who did not graduate with an advanced degree but rather those
associated with degrees required for the entry into the profession of nursing, the expectation is
that survey respondents overall had recently commenced entry into their nursing careers. Overall,
91.4% of the sample had education types typically associated with entry into the profession of
nursing.
Age also had an inverse relationship with the respondents’ information privacy protection
response (IPPR) but not their concern for information privacy (CFIP). Those in the higher age
groups tended to show a response to the end of protecting their own data. However, there was no
difference in age regarding the concern for information privacy of their own patients.
While the sample was generally homogenous with respect to having had an education
type consistent with the entry into the profession, no relation was found between the type of
education and any of the core variables study. Furthermore, the type of school (public, private,
for-profit) did not yield any results as to its relationship with any of the core variables either.
Therefore, neither education type nor school type had any impact on knowledge or risk.
As one of this study’s intentions is to inform educators, this finding should be particularly
noteworthy considering the current zeitgeist in which the baccalaureate degree has been sought
after as the minimum entry point into the profession by multiple groups and in some cases
encouraged through market forces in certain regions within the United States. The Institute of
Medicine (IOM) has recommended an increase to an 80% composition of nurses at the
baccalaureate level by the year 2020 (Yakusheva, 2014). Furthermore, higher baccalaureatelevel proportions are associated with better outcomes according to hospital studies (Yakusheva,
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2014). While improved outcomes have been appraised in the clinical setting, knowledge of
information security or risk behavior does not supply any addition evidence in support of raising
the entry level into the profession, as those factors are not related to education type.
The 71% majority of respondents had nursing education at the baccalaureate or higher
level with 27.6% having reported a nursing education from an Associate Degree or diploma
program. This nursing education type is consistent with NSNA survey data. As the survey
question inquired at the type of nursing program degree, a determination cannot be presumed as
to the highest level of education obtained. For example, a person with a master’s degree may
have pursued a nursing career by way of an Associate Degree and thus would have be
constrained to report that lower level degree on the survey.
Phone Characteristics
To texture a survey regarding new nurses’ mobile device usage, information pertaining to
their particular mobile device of use was collected with respect to phone manufacturer, model,
and operating system by derivation if such a determination could be extrapolated. While these
data elements were not analyzed in relation to the core variable, this information could be used
for future research or informative unto itself as indicative of the current landscape of mobile
device usages among new nurses. Due to a plethora of phone manufacturers and continuously
emerging models, the decision was made to leave this survey element as a free text field. In
retrospect, data analysis on such a field was arduous due to variations in spelling and imprecise
responses. For any future research capturing such data, a single-select option with the most
pervasive operating systems of the time along with an “other” selection could yield cleaner data
from which to analyze.
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The information collected pertained to the “personal use of technologies at work and at
home.” As such, the distinction could not be made as to which devices were employer-supplied
or intended for personal use. As stated in Chapter 4, clinical nurse usage of phones for clinical
usage is limited and often for the voice communication. While the collected data cannot be
definitively attributed to personal phone usage, a general inference may be based upon
commonplace mobile device usage for work purposes among nurses in a clinical setting.
While the emergence of bring-your-own-device (BYOD) modalities are becoming more
pervasive in healthcare, this technology is often limited to non-clinical staff for business
purposes. Current trends indicate an increased prevalence of mobile devices in the healthcare
workplace without the adoption of adequate security standards (Hewitt, Dolezel, & McLeod,
2017). Therefore, the burden in part is placed upon healthcare entities and nurses in particular to
protect sensitive information thus making the understanding of their information security
knowledge, risk behavior, and other factors are the more relevant with this emerging paradigm.
The overwhelming majority of the world’s phone market consists of Android phones at
86.1%. Android-operated phones using Google’s Android operating system and include a
plethora of manufacturers and models with variations in terms of functionality and security
features. This diverse Android marketplace at times may see the need for configuration
requirements on the phones themselves in order to bring these devices in alignment with
employers’ mobile device management systems (MDM) compared to Apple models with
inherent security safeguards. An MDS provides security assurances and configuration control.
As this Android marketplace is diverse, such configurations are not universally applicable as
different models have different security feature implementations.
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Relatively inverse to worldwide prevalence, the 70.73% majority of new nurses tend to
use Apple phones, which have the iOS operating system. The new nurse usage is a departure
from the general population. This finding should be encouraging from an information security
perspective as such devices come from a single manufacturer with limited model offerings, and
therefore has a somewhat predictable security posture. Both the hardware and software come
from a single manufacturer with limited supported devices and a single operating system line.
These devices tend to require less configuration to align with the employer-based MDM. While
using an employer-based MDM is not commonplace as is the introduction of personal phones
into the nurses’ clinical practice, it nonetheless serves as a marker for the security standards
employed by the iOS devices.
Samsung had a 21.64% usage in the study and remains the largest of Android-based
manufacturers in both the study and the world. Microsoft’s Windows phone has a single report
and may have been an outlier as worldwide usage of these models is quite sparse.
Descriptive Findings of the Study
This section will address the overarching main question of the study, “How much do new
nurses know about security of information systems and does their knowledge influence their risk
behaviors in using mobile technology?” In doing so, common mobile technology usage is
described with data related to mobile application and security usage analyzed using descriptive
statistical analysis. This information was included in the study to provide background
information on new nurses’ usage in the context of the major variables examined herein this
study.
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Mobile Application Use
A series of descriptive analyses were performed in an effort to answer the question “What
is the reported level and type of new nurse mobile application use?” The prevailing features
were Text Messaging (N=272), Social Media (N=250), and Web Browsing (N=234).
The 88.5% majority of respondents used social media either sometimes or very often.
The type of social media platform was not asked. At the time of this analysis, the predominant
social media platform is Facebook with 2.2 billion active users (Statista, 2018). This survey was
conducted prior to the privacy disclosure involving the purported misuse of user-related data by
Cambridge Analytica (Granville, 2018). There may be opportunities for future research to be
conducted on nurses’ social media usage in light of this privacy issue taking on the massive
media and political attention it has caused related to personal privacy.
Not surprisingly, chatting, online library, and video/movie usage was low. It should be
noted that chatting might be considered uncommon vernacular supplanted by the term texting.
This could perhaps account for the low level of reported usage. The online library usage may
have been more apt to a student sample as the studied group consisted of nurses who had already
graduated. These new nurses may use online medical references but speculatively may not have
equated that usage with the term “online library” which may be more associated with school use.
With fourteen participants declaring that the online library was not available, those respondents
may have speculatively referred to the feature as not being available as a native application in the
manner that camera, text, mail, and contact apps are commonly included as default operating
system features.
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Security Practice Results
The survey had an element related to a common security practice, which is the locking of
a device. The purpose of locking a device is to prevent unauthorized access to the device.
Locking may occur automatically by the device at a pre-set interval without any use activity or
through manual intervention often manifesting itself with the click of a button. The locking of a
device would require re-authentication to the device by the authorized user. At the time of this
survey, standard authentication methods may consist of a numerical passcode, usernamepassword combination, fingerprint scan, pattern drawing or facial recognition.
Instead of a binary response selection, the question was asked in a matrix format about
the frequency to which this locking practice occurred with phones and tablets both personally
owned and employer-supplied. The distinction of frequency is informative and may be
indicative of a propensity to protect information. Opportunities may exist for future studies
regarding such a propensity relating other security practices to the key variables in this study.
A majority listed hospital phones and mobile devices as not applicable regarding locking
at 56.0% and 58.2% respectively. As previously discussed, the supposition is that nurses do not
commonly use their mobile phones for clinical practice. The MDM solutions typically include
those mandatory locking features in addition to likely requiring more secure authentication
methods than the device’s native minimum requirements. This could include a requirement for a
complex numerical passcode of six digits as opposed to a simpler one of four digits or even no
authentication required at all. With the emergence of the MDM solution, this security practice
may be automatically performed. Perhaps a plausible explanation for the reported lack of
availability might be the absence of required nurse intervention to perform this security function.
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Regarding personal phones and mobile devices, the “always” response prevailed. This
indicates that new nurses recognize the existence of the security feature and actively use it. New
nurses lock their personal phones and devices at 83.5% and 70.5% respectively for often and
always indicated as a practice. Nurses are aware of and take action to safeguard their own
devices from unauthorized physical access. While this process may be automated in the
workplace for those employers who have implemented an MDM solution and configured it for
this feature, educations and employers should know that nurses typically safeguard data
habitually at least in respect to unauthorized physical access based upon the finding that 83.5%
of new nurses reported locking their phones often or always.
Level of Knowledge
The survey instrument included the knowledge of information security (KISS) measure,
developed by the principal investigator, and administered as a pilot to a convenience sample of
nursing students (N=167) prior to the full study implementation.
A predicted finding, and comforting result albeit a weak correlation, is that knowledge is
inversely related to risk. Those with greater knowledge of information system security have a
reduced predilection toward risk behavior in their use of mobile devices, as those with higher
knowledge scores tend to have a safer posture. The new nurses with information security
knowledge may understand risks and therefore participate in fewer risk activities. This finding
could be informative and possible lead to future research in behavior analysis. This should also
inform educators and employers that knowledge may be a mitigating factor in reducing risk
behavior. This finding supports healthcare employer practices of HHS-mandated security
awareness training, which tends to focus on knowledge. Perhaps behavior-based practices may
be more suitable for risk behavior reduction as a supplement to knowledge. There is an
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opportunity for future studies in order to understand the relationship between risk behavior and
knowledge in light of this finding.
For the most part, the knowledge portion of the survey had the majority responding
correctly and the histogram showed a normal distribution and grade score consistent with that of
a college education program. However, there were a few outliers of interest.
Most notable is that only 27.4% of the sample responded correctly to item 15 in the KISS
instrument. The question refers to a nefarious attempt to by a third party to acquire a person’s
credentials through a cleverly designed email. This type of email correspondence, commonly
known as a “phishing” attack, is a social engineering technique with the intended purpose to trick
the recipient. Phishing is a type of social engineering attack, which may target healthcare, a
specific institution, a specific person, or may simply be delivered to a nurse incidentally as part
of a larger campaign to steal credentials. The broader subject of social engineering is discussed
in chapter two.
With this item being the lowest score, perhaps the result could inform educators and
employers of an identified gap to pursue. Credentials may be stolen for not only direct access to
patient and financial information but may also be used to control computer systems. At the time
of this analysis, many phishing emails contain or compel the user to obtain malicious code that
could cause severe disruption in computer systems such as Ransomware (Palmer, 2017).
Ransomware is essentially malicious software or a virus, which scrambles one or more computer
systems rendering them unusable until an untraceable financial ransom is provided to the
perpetrator. The impact of such an attack has been proven to affect the clinical functioning of a
healthcare entity for extended periods as clinical systems moreover are digitally connected.
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Therefore, understanding this knowledge question may have not only privacy implications but
clinical ones as well.
Several questions were related to the proper disclosure of PHI for which legal guidance
has been outlined. In 2013, HHS provided direction for permissible cases of PHI disclosure (45
CFR parts 160 and 164). The KISS item 4 refers to permission to view a relative’s chart. The
ability to access the chart does not infer permission. There are circumstances whereby access to
a relative’s PHI would be permitted by law but being a nurse does not warrant an exception unto
itself. In the absence of certain conditions and generally speaking, the law does not permit
access to a relative’s data. However, 57.8% of new nurses believed that access to relative’s data
was permissible. This item too offers a potential knowledge gap worth further exploration for
education and employers.
Knowledge is related to neither the CFIP nor the IPPR. This describes how new nurses
may have concern over the protection of patient information and exhibit responses whether or
not they have an understanding of information system security.
Level of Risk
Analysis of risk behavior has produced a paradoxical unanticipated finding. Risk
behavior has already been discussed as having an inverse relationship with knowledge. Unlike
knowledge, risk behavior is also directly related to both the CFIP and IPPR. This infers that new
nurses who engage in higher rates of risk behavior activities related to their use of mobile
devices have both a low knowledge of information security and an affinity to not only have
concern for privacy but also exhibit protective responses. A plausible elucidation is that new
nurses with an elevation in risk behavior may have a sense of self-awareness that their actions

116

may put sensitive information at risk and are therefore more cognizant of the implications to the
safeguarding of protected health information.
The acceptance of using personal email for patient information by a minor segment of
new nurses is an education gap that could be filled. While the HHS final ruling modifying the
HIPAA Security Rule does not explicitly prohibit the use of personal email for PHI, the onus is
on the healthcare entity to safeguard protected health information and personal email is
considered a risk vehicle for the correspondence of PHI. Yahoo, a large provider of personal
email, reported that all three billion of their accounts were hacked in 2013 (Business Time
Singapore, 2017). The willingness of some to use PHI in email textured with a relatively low
number of respondents appropriately responding to a phishing attack and in context with Yahoo
hack disclosure should indicate that targeted education and the implementation of security
controls regarding email use may be suitable.
Unexpectedly, 19.9% of new nurses declared that they download pirated material
although most stated the occurrences to be rare. Employers should be aware and have security
measures in place to prevent the downloading of unauthorized material regardless of the finding.
Legal considerations notwithstanding, the acquisition of products without using reputable means
could lead to cybersecurity incidents such as the introduction of malware and viruses. Note that
the use of antivirus is not to be considered a universal protector or panacea against viruses as
seen with numerous cybersecurity incidents in the news, the most noteworthy at the time of this
data collection, being WannaCry, a virus that caused billions of dollars in damage worldwide;
including the healthcare sector (Reuters, 2017). Although WannaCry was not propagated by
illegally obtained software or even by email (as widely falsely reported), the example serves as
the degree to which virus can cause damage. WannaCry is used in this instance, as it is the
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widest cybersecurity attack to date and affected systems worldwide including clinical systems.
This risk behavior has the potential to affect the functionality of clinical systems.
In the reported behaviors, it would appear that financial data breaches occurred in 30% of
new nurses. Conversely and in alignment with the new nurses’ financial data breach finding,
only 27.4% of new nurses recognized the phishing attack from the knowledge survey. The
question did not offer any determination as to how the data may have been breached or to what
degree. The data suggests that new nurses may lack knowledge of key areas of common attack
by nefarious agents and many may have already suffered data breaches with financial
implications by the time they embarked on their career. Both the data breach and knowledge
question statistics support a lack of knowledge and sophistication with both security practices
and knowledge. This confluence of factors indicates a need for better education both in school
and in the workplace to recognize phishing attacks. Simulated phishing attacks are offered by
vendors as part of an effort to educate employees and encourage engagement to report instances
to the employer.
Information Privacy Protection Responses and Concern for Information Privacy
New nurses’ Concern For Information Privacy and the Information Privacy Protective
Responses are directly related to one another. Analysis included the subscales of the CFIP as
well as the variable as a whole. This finding was anticipated as the CFIP elements were posed in
the context of nurses’ concern for patient information. The IPPR, although questioned in the
context of responding to transgressions involving the nurses’ information, is consistent in its
relation to the IPPR as prior studies (Kuo, Ma, & Alexander, 2014). Age is not related to the
CFIP but it is related to the IPPR even as CFIP and IPPR are however related to one another.
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The level of concern about patient information is unrelated to age. There is no significant
relation between age and CFIP. Although there is a negligible correlation between age and the
IPPR, the direction is inverse.
Reliability of All Measurement Scales
As discussed in Chapter 4, the instrument reliability has been assessed and reported in
descriptive and tabulated formats using Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimates for the pilot (n=167)
and the nationwide study (n=514). While the goal of having Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate
values of .70 or greater for each instrument, the KISS instrument was accepted at the principal
investigator’s discretion with a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .669. Based upon the
discovery that the reduction in knowledge score elements would yield only minor increments in
improving the value and that the reduction of elements would reduce informative results, the
score was accepted without reduction in items. The knowledge score was developed by the
principle investigator with an expert jury panel and delivered to a convenience sample of nursing
student. The Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP), Information Personal Protective
Response, the four subscales for the Concern for Information Privacy (AU= Unauthorized
Access; SU=Secondary Use; ME=Medical Errors; CO=Personal Collection of Medical
Information), Knowledge of Information Security Systems (KISS) and the Risk Behaviors (RB)
were the scales modified from existing scales in the literature (Kuo, Ma, & Alexander, 2014) and
used with permission in this study with demonstrated reliability.
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Reported Threat Appraisal – “Worry” About a Consequence – Ranked Groups
Threat appraisal was surveyed to determine the degree to which new nurses would be
worried about consequences resulting from a security incident. This was a rank-order question
on a scale of 1-4 with 4 being the most severe sense of worry. This was an effort to determine
the level of internal versus external threat. Internal threat was related to the nurses themselves
whereas external was related to consequences for others. More specifically, the internal threat
asked about job loss and fines to the nurse. The external threat asked about the consequences to
the patient and fines to the hospital.
The internal threat of the fine to the nurse was directly related to knowledge. Results
related to the external threat to patient privacy suggests that further exploration may be
warranted. The internal threat of job loss was not found to relate to any of the core variables, nor
were any other aggregate associations. Further study might be warranted on focusing on some of
the factors associated with these threat appraisal categories.

Question: Is Knowledge a Predictor of Risk and Concern for Information Privacy Total and
Factors?

Knowledge Related To Risk
Speculatively, these results could infer that having a workforce membership with higher
knowledge of information security could result in a lower level of risk behaviors associated with
those devices. This finding could inform educators and stakeholders of information security of
the need for knowledge in order to reduce risk behaviors among nurses who make up the largest
segment of workforce membership in the healthcare industry.
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Knowledge Related To Concern For Information Privacy
Knowledge is related to neither the CFIP nor IPPR, which are closely correlated to one
another.
Question: Are Risk Behaviors Related to Concern for Information Privacy Total and
Factors?
CFIP and IPPR are related to one another with risk behaviors showing a positive
correlation to both. However, CFIP and IPPR are more strongly correlated than either is to risk
behavior. As discussed, the CFIP and IPPR correlation was anticipated and are consistent with
findings from the Kuo, Ma, and Alexander (2014) study from which elements of this study were
derived.
Although the relation between risk behavior to both the IPPR and CFIP is informative,
this was not the hypothesis to be tested, and in fact, significant in the opposite direction from the
hypothesis. The hypotheses suggesting a relationship between CFIP, IPPR and risk behaviors
were predicted to have an inverse correlation. That is to state that lower risk behavior was
anticipated to show an increase in both concern and response.
Perhaps those new nurses who engage in an increased risk behavior may be aware of the
harm potential. The nurses may be more apprehensive about the protection of sensitive data
given their understanding and susceptibility to behaviors that increase risk. As this finding was
unanticipated and counterintuitive, there may be an opportunity for further study of these factors’
relationship.
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Question: Is Threat Appraisal Associated with Knowledge, Risk, Concern for Information
Privacy Total and Factors, and Personal Protective Responses?
Threat is not related to risk behavior, CFIP, or IPPR. The internal threat of nurse fine is
however related to knowledge whereas the external threat to patient privacy approaches
significance and may be worthwhile of further investigation.
OCR is the branch of HHS charged with enforcement of regulation infractions related to
PHI. OCR action has resulted in large fines to healthcare entities and those actions have been
covered by the media in addition to being placed onto the proverbial “wall of shame.” However,
nurses are not typically named in any of these high-profile actions. The anecdotal messages
through either school or the employment experience may have shaped these nurses’ sense of
threat.
Threat – Internal and External
The survey contains four elements that are evenly divided into external and internal
related threats. Those results are discussed in the subsequent sections as analysis was performed
to test for differences in mean scores on the core variables. In future studies, these should be
more granularly described to produce a more meaningful distribution of responses.
An ANOVA was performed on the mean score for the threat of nurse fine (internal
threat) showing statistically significant differences for knowledge but none of the other core
variables. The highest threat ranking with a mean score of .81 indicates the highest threat of fine
have the lowest knowledge score. Perhaps those who have a greater understanding of
information system security are less worried of fines as opposed to those without knowledge
having a fear of the unknown. It should be noted that this fear is unsubstantiated as newsworthy
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action taken by OCR typically results in fines and corrective action directed at institutions and
physician practices, not individual nurses.
The mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR by the threat
ranks on the threat of job loss (internal threat) showed no differences among mean scores. The
same results stand for threat to patient privacy (external threat) and threat of hospital fine
(external threat). The threat to patient privacy (external) may have implication for further
research as this was the only other factor approaching significance.

Hypothesis Testing: Demographic Variables
Is knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses influenced by select demographic
characteristics such as gender, age and education (program type or school type)?

Differences in Knowledge, Risk, and Concern for Information Privacy and Protective Responses
Age Related To Knowledge, Risk Behaviors
From the study findings, the conclusion is that risk behaviors are related to knowledge
and knowledge is related to age, but age is not related to risk behaviors or concern. Age is
directly related to knowledge. Those in the older age group had higher knowledge scores. This
suggests although nursing experience was primarily eliminated, those in the older group may
have had other experiences that could have contributed to their knowledge base. Knowledge of
information security is different from skills related to the use of clinical information systems.
Although the younger group may be considered digital natives, it is their older counterparts that
have the insight to produce significantly higher knowledge scores.
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While not a primary variable, the time spent using mobile devices is inversely related to
age. There are also notable differences in the use of mobile device features by age. Age is
inversely related to the IPPR but not related to the CFIP or risk behavior.
Education Related To Knowledge, Risk Behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR
In general, nursing education prepares prospective nurses for entry into the profession. It
serves as a major component of the prerequisites mandated by the individual state board to
receive licensure with each state regulatory body setting such licensure requirements.
Educational institutions are subject to accreditation requirements set forth by sanctioned
accreditation bodies.
The NSNA serves over 60,000 members from across the United States and its territories
serving in both an advocacy and promotional role in its mission to support the development of
emerging professional nurses. With its vast membership, this organization could serve as a
vehicle for delivering cybersecurity guidance to the masses. None of the core variables studied
were related to the type of education program or type of school which indicates that tailoring
cybersecurity guidance to those demographic targets is not necessary. However, gaps in
cybersecurity knowledge of new nurses were uncovered by this study.
Furthermore, cybersecurity education tends to be deficient for nurses in their education
programs and even for students of computer science where such information may be considered
more germane to this area of study (Rozenfeld, 2016). This absence of cybersecurity knowledge
in education is not unique to nursing program and member associations.
The National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NSCSBN) offers guidance mostly
related to social media use which has implications tangentially related to cybersecurity but is for
the most part lacking in cybersecurity knowledge needed to support the safeguard of PHI in the
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workplace. Both the NSNA and the NSCSBN could see the gap as an opportunity to educate its
members through a program of cybersecurity guidance.
The standard demographic elements from the NSNA included questions related to the
type of school such as public or private. The survey also asked the type of education in the
nursing program such as associate, baccalaureate, or masters. The type of school and type of
education did not yield any relation to the core variables. The nursing education variables did
not have any impact on their knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, or IPPR. The Institute for
Medicine has called for an increase to an 80% ratio of nurses with a baccalaureate by the year
2020 and hospital-based studies have supported this notion with findings showing improved
outcomes (Yakusheva, 2014). However, no such supportive findings are evident in this study
related to the security of mobile devices among new nurses.
Limitations
Information related to employment status, type of employment, healthcare-related
experience, and Registered Nurse experience for those with advanced degrees was not collected.
By using a sample of nurses one-year post graduation, the sample was considered mostly
homogenous in relation to experience.
Of the 649 respondents, 135 of those did not opt to complete the knowledge section.
Speculatively, this section may have seemed daunting as the largest segment of the survey and
participants may have experienced a sense of survey fatigue.
The sample consisted only of those nurses who were NSNA members and had agreed to
receive correspondence such as this survey. This 514-person sample represented only those
members who self-selected to perform the study to its completion. This pool may be considered
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representative of new nurses from across the nation, but not necessarily the entire population of
nurses in the United States or the world for that matter.
NSNA was gracious in administering the survey to their members. Without their
collaboration, obtaining such a sample for which to study may not have been possible or at least
an arduous task at best. However, the survey product, methodology of delivery, and follow up
were directed by NSNA. The demographic questions were also the NSNA standard used on their
surveys. While not a constraint unto itself, flexibility to augment the process was nonetheless
limiting.
The knowledge score was internally developed by the principal investigator with
validation by a jury panel and content validity analysis. This instrument was not based upon a
gold standard instrument as one does not currently exist for the population studied and with the
content used to construct the instrument.
Conclusion
Data security incidents and issues are regularly featured in the media. The public has
been exposed to a growing sense of awareness about cybersecurity and the implications for their
privacy.
Former government contractor Eric Snowden provided revelations as to the United States
government operation with data collection and analytic activities. Russian government
operations have been implicated in hacking and social media activites resulting in the
interference with the United States 2016 Presidential election (Shane, Sanger, &` Kramer,
2017).
Related to the reports of Russian hacking is the disclosure that Facebook users’
information was misappropriated by a data analytics company for the expressed purpose of
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influencing the same election (Granville, 2018). The disclosure about the misue of Facebook
data is an example of the Concern For Information Privacy subscales. Collection: The data was
collected. Secondary Use: The data was then used by a third party unbeknownst to the users that
had their data collected.
Other political activites include North Korea’s purported creation and spread of the
WannaCry virus, the most vast cybersecurity incident in history resulting in detrimental effects
to the world’s economy and to the clinical operations of healthcare facilities. The United States
Department of Homeland Security has issued a bulletin aobut activities by the Russian
Government resuling in the infiltration into energy sector computers (DOH, 2018). The
techniques described in the bulletin may also be applied to the healthcare sector.
The general public may relate more to nefarious activities that are personally-directed.
These include identify theft, credit card fraud, hijacked online accounts, and even phishing phone
scams. An example of phone phishing are those prevalent calls with fake Internal Revenue
Service representatives demanding back taxes. Related to healthcare, an emerging scam is the
fake hospital representative calling to collect bills or finanical data. Yahoo had virtually all of its
accounts hacked. Equifax, Target, and Home Depot have had high profile breaches affecting
consumers’ financial data. Anthem’s 2015 cybersecurity incident was also prominently covered
in the media after nearly 80 million company records were hacked, including a substantial
portion from individuals who were not even customers of Anthem.
In brief, the public has a sense of awareness about information security and its affects on
their own personal data. This personal data includes PHI. Anthem was probably the most
prevelant healthcare related cybersecurity event reported in the news media. The media has also
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repeatedly reported on hospital ransomware infections. An identity theft protetion company ran a
promotional advertisement regarding PHI data theft.
In addition to public awareness, healthcare entities are faced with the pressure of
compliance with regulation meant to safeguard PHI and penalties for both noncompliance and
incidents. While certainly protective mechanisms span a multitude of factors, the workforce is a
major part of an overall cybersecurity strategy. In healthcare, the largest professional segment
consists of nurses; hence the importance of this study.
For education, this study has produced implications. First and foremost is that education
contains only sparse information related to information security. This is not only true for
nursing, but other disciplines including computer science (Rozenfeld, 2016). Some of the data
elements with the knowledge section indicated key weaknesses which have the potential to put
patient data at risk.
A recommendation from this study is that security awareness training should be
conducted at all levels of nursing education meant for entry into the profession. As variations in
quality and content may result from organically-grown institution-specific programs, perhaps a
national or international organization may develop education standards or a framework to
provide uniform coverage of education material across the nation. This investigator is a member
of the Health Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS) National Education Task
Force and would look to organizations such as this with a history of successfully implementing
standards.
Employers already have a mandate from HHS to provide security awareness training to
its workforce members. However, regulations are not perscriptive as to the content or manner of
instruction. This study should provide information to employers not only on key areas of
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knowledge to address but also the understanding of nurse risk behavior and mobile device usage.
A vehicle to provide comprehenisve education akin to the aforementioned nursing education
recommendation might be via the state and local hospital associations that supply its members
with recommendations and services.
Mobile device manufacturers and MDM vendors are already addressing the security
needs of its healthcare use base. However, the lines between clinical systems, medical devices,
wearable devices, and mobile devices is becoming blurred and likely to continue as new
innovations emerge and are facilitated by mobile device platforms that are condusive to the rapid
development of highly usabel system. The term IOT (internet of things) describes the
phenomenon of smart internet-connected devices such a locks, alarms, and other innovations.
With these factors in mind, mobile device vendors should develop hardened systems and
platforms which address the cybersecurity needs of the healthcare industry at present and with a
flexible foundation to endure the foreseeable future. Currently, healthcare does not have
uniformly perscriptive standards for safeguarding these devices by legislation, only market
forces (customers) and government agency guidance.
Employers should focus on implementing technology and processes that remove the
human element from security wherever possible while having the least negative impact on
clinical function and system usability. As discussed in the social engineering section, humans
are the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain. Removing human factors from cybersecurity
should be a key endeavor and permit clinicians to focus on patients. The solutions should be
turn-key and transparent to the nurses. Make security compliance easy to obtain and expect a
higher rate of security compliance in return.
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In conclusion this nationwide study has examined new nurses’ knowledge of information
systems, risk behaviors, concern for information privacy, information privacy protective
responses, threat appeal, associations among the variables, and associations with collected
demographic detail. Nurses are the largest segment of the healthcare workforce and the human
element in the protection of patient information. Therefore this study is imperative to understand
nurses as a key endeavor protecting our health system in the informatics age. The study also
provides recommendations to educators, employers, and mobile device manufacturers. Findings
also offer opportunities for further research which will undoubtably be necessary as the
information system landscape evolves.
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Appendix A – Study Permission Fuzzy Logic

Figure 11 Permission: Fuzzy Assessment of Health Information System Users Security
Awareness Survey and Study
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Appendix B – Fuzzy Logic Materials

Figure 12 Permission: Fuzzy Assessment of Health Information System Users Security
Awareness Survey and Study With Materials
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Appendix C – Study Permission Violation of Information Security

Figure 13 Permission: How Patients Respond To Violation of Their Information Privacy

139

Appendix D – Molloy College Institution Review Board Approval

Figure 14 Molloy Institution Review Board Approval Letter
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Appendix E - Pilot Survey
Demographic Background Information
1. Are you male or female?
o
o

Male
Female

2. When did you graduate from your basic nursing (RN) program?
o
o
o
o

2016
2015
2014
Before 2014

3. What program did you complete for your nursing degree?
o
o
o
o
o

Baccalaureate Degree in Nursing
Associates Degree in Nursing
Accelerated Baccalaureate Degree in Nursing
Master’s Degree in Nursing
Other

3. What is your age?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

<17
18-20
21-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+

6. Does your program include educational sessions regarding the security of electronic health
records?
o
o
o

Yes
No
Other (please specify) __________________________________________________

7. Does your program include educational material regarding the security of electronic health
records?
o
o
o

Yes
No
Other (please specify) __________________________________________________
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Information Systems Security Survey
Professional Habits (Risk Taking Behaviors)
(Includes All Items – Content Review by Experts)
*(R) = Reverse Coded Item (âRisk)
8. For my mobile device (phone/tablet), I …..
Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Frequently

Always

…use my fingerprint complex passcode, or
gesture to log on. (R)
…regular update my operating system. (R)
…“jailbreak”, or use a customized
environment to get free apps.
…click on email links to reset my password.
…use free Wi-Fi at public locations such as
cafes and airports.
…keep my device attended and in my
possession. (R)
…encrypt my device (Apple users may select
always). (R)
…text patient information with colleagues
(aside from corporate applications).
…use personal email containing patient
information.
…accept invitations for games and apps
through social networks.
…download movies/music/apps by pirating or
otherwise without paying (aside from legit
streaming services).
…have a complex Wi-Fi password on the
home router. (R)
…share my password (any) with others such
as family, friends, or coworkers
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N/A

…use autofill to complete my information in
websites.
…submit my personal information such as
name, address, phone number, and credit card
info into websites when requested.
…chat with strangers online.
…post personal information on social media
sites.
…have had my financial/credit information
personally breached (aside from publicized
breaches of corporations).
…have had my passwords stolen/misused.
This would be evident by unauthorized
emails/posts sent or known to sites/services
accessed by unauthorized entities.
9. I would……
Never

Sometimes

Frequently

Always

…report chart printouts found
in a garbage can or publiclyaccessible fax/printer. (R)
…chat with others about
patient information outside of
work.
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Information System Security Knowledge
(Includes All Items Used for Content Review by Experts)
Choose the best answer.
You may not be fully in agreement with the answer.
You may have to choose one answer from what you feel may be multiple correct answers.
* = Correct Response
10. If my co-worker’s login does not work, I may share mine.
o True
o False *
11. Putting patient information on a USB drive is acceptable if….
o
o
o
o

My superior instructs me to do so.
The USB drive encrypted and used in a manner consistent with institutional policy. *
I delete it shortly thereafter.
I keep the USB drive securely on my person at all times.

12. Texting patient information is acceptable if….
o
o
o
o

My supervisor instructs me to do so.
I am using a hospital-issued cell phone.
I am using a hospital-issued secure messaging system. *
I urgently need to communicate with a physician.

13. Placing patient information on my personal computer is acceptable if….
o
o
o
o
o

My supervisor instructs me to do so.
I have antivirus and a firewall.
I am a private contractor with contracted responsibility and liability.
I have a HIPAA-compliant logon.
None of the above. *

14. I may access my relative/spouse/partner/friend’s electronic health information if….
o
o
o
o

This person gave me permission to do so.
I need information to care for this relative at home.
I am helping this person to access information though the patient portal. *
My supervisor instructs me to do so.

15. If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s chart…
o I provide it on a USB drive
o I print out the chart.
o I ask my supervisor for guidance.
144

o I do not provide any information without a court order and would refer the office to the
medical records department. *
16. If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I….
o
o
o
o

Hand it in to security or lost and found. *
Use it at home.
Use it at the hospital.
Dispose of it in the garbage.

17. If I discover a coworker/classmate has an accessed their relative’s information, I….
o Report this person to the supervisor or other personnel per institution policy. *
o Remind the person that this behavior is not acceptable and in violation of HPAA
regulations.
o Do nothing as no action is necessary on my part.
o Contact administration or hospital-supplied privacy number. *
18. If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my password, I….
o
o
o
o

Provide it as the helpdesk is a trusted entity.
Would never provide my password. *
Call back to helpdesk to verify identity.
Check with my supervisor first.

19. If IT (computer department) sends me an email to upgrade my email and asks me to verify
my password. I….
o
o
o
o

Enter my username and password after clicking on the email in order to upgrade
Report the email to the proper person. *
Ask my supervisor for advice.
Delete the email. *

20. If my password is not working and my coworker/classmate offers to log in for me, I….
o
o
o
o
o

Let my coworker to log in so I can continue working.
Respectfully refuse and contact the helpdesk for assistance.
Already have no coworker/classmate’s password and log in.
Remind my coworker not to share passwords and report if appropriate.
Both D & B *

21. I can put patient data on a USB stick if….
o I use it for work purposes.
o I always keep it in my possession.
o Make sure to delete the data when finished.
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o It is encrypted/scrambled and used according to hospital policy. *
22. If a website informs me that JAVA must be updated, I….
o
o
o
o

Contact the helpdesk. *
Install the file from the website.
Ask my supervisor.
Ignore the message.

23. If a computer message from the FBI states my files have been scrambled and I must pay 1
$300 fine, I…
o
o
o
o

Pay the file and have my files accessible.
Ignore the message and use another computer.
Contact the helpdesk. *
Ask my supervisor.

24. If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and requests a wire transfer, I….
o
o
o
o

Follow the instructions to avoid legal repercussions.
Contact the helpdesk or security. *
Hang up.
Report the call to the authorities.

25. If my phone regularly requires updates every few months. I….
o
o
o
o

Update promptly. *
Ignore the message.
Call the helpdesk.
Contact the phone carrier.

26. An email from my bank states my account had been compromised and I must verify my
identity by clicking on a link and filling out some information, I….
o
o
o
o

Enter my personal information to verify my identity and preserve my account.
Ignore and delete the email.
Contact the helpdesk. *
Call the bank.

27. My coworker received a strange email from me requesting money, I….
o Tell the coworker it’s a mistake and to ignore the email.
o Ask the coworker to respond to the other email address listed in the email to state that
this is a mistake.
o Contact the helpdesk. *
o Contact that other email address in the email with a nasty message.
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28. A well-known national realtor sends an email with the subject “Hot Properties in Your
Neighborhood”. The link requests a Gmail or Yahoo login to proceed. Assuming there’s an
interest, I….
o
o
o
o

Log in using my Gmail or Yahoo account.
Contact the helpdesk. *
Delete the email.
Ask my supervisor.

29. The corner deli that typically delivers lunch complains they received a fax with patient
information, I….
o
o
o
o

Instruct the deli to throw out the papers.
Instruct the deli to wait for me to pick up papers.
Contact helpdesk, compliance or other department per policy. *
Ask the deli to return the papers with the next lunch delivery.

30. When leaving a computer logged in with my password, I….
o
o
o
o

Lock the computer. *
Sign out.
Leave it out courtesy for my coworker.
Leave it asking my coworkers not to touch it.

31. A pop-up appears informing me the computer is running slow, I….
o
o
o
o

Follow the instructions as the computer has been running quite slow.
Close the pop-up and continue working.
Contact the helpdesk. *
Ask the supervisor.

32. Taking patient or chart photos with my own cell phone is acceptable if….
o
o
o
o
o

Delete after using.
A program is used to cover any identifiable information.
Done so in strict accordance with hospital policy permits.
Requested to do so by a doctor.
Never. *

33. A person without a hospital badge states he is from IT and needs me to login for him to fix
the slowness problem, I….
o Log in for him as the electronic records as the system has been slow.
o Ask him for his hospital badge and upon display log in for him.
o Ask him for the hospital badge and state policy will not permit you to log in for him. *
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o Call security if he does not show the badge upon request. *
34. I may work with documents containing patient information on my home computer or
laptop….
o
o
o
o

If I delete the files afterwards.
If I password protect my computer.
If my supervisor gives me permission.
No, this is not permitted. *

35. If I need to look at my health records, I….
o Look in the electronic health records as this is my data and policy applies to other
patient’s data.
o Look in the electronic health records if explicitly permitted by policy.
o Use the patient portal or medical records department. *
o Ask any doctor to look up my information.
36. If a law firm requests patient information, I….
o
o
o
o

Provide the information on a USB stick the supply.
Print out the information for them.
Allow them to view the information, but not have a copy.
Contact medical records, security, supervisor, or other personnel as per policy. *

37. If a standard computer without encryption has a sensitive file that is purposefully deleted…
o
o
o
o

I can be sure that it is gone as I emptied the computer trash container.
Do not know if it is really gone. *
Definitely gone no matter what because I have password on my computer.
Only gone once I reboot.

38. It is acceptable to backup patient information to my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox,
iCloud, etc...) for safekeeping.
o
o
o
o

If I make sure I use a strong password.
If I delete the files when I’m done with them
If I do not let anyone know.
Never as this is not permitted. *
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39. If my coworker suspects someone must have looked at his/her health record due to gossip
about his/her condition, I would…
o
o
o
o

Assure my coworker that no one would have looked at the health records.
Ask around who looked at the health records.
Warn people no to look at coworkers’ health information.
Make an inquiry/report to corporate compliance or appropriate entity per policy. *

40. If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing sensitive information, I…
o
o
o
o

Wait until the device turns up and take later if it does not.
Know it’s secure because I need a password to log in.
Know it’s secure because I erased all of the sensitive information.
Contact security, helpdesk or other entity as required by policy. *
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Nurses’ Belief About Medical Facilities and Personal Health Information
Concern for Information Protection (CFIP) Scales
Regarding the use of technology related to personal health information, please state your opinion
on the following statements. Medical facilities should…….
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Disagree

…devote more time and effort to preventing the
unauthorized access of patients’ personal
information. (UA)
… prevent unauthorized people from accessing
patients’ personal information without
considering the cost. (UA)
…take more measures to ensure that
unauthorized people cannot use their computer
to access patient’s information. (UA)
… never use patients’ personal information for
purposes other than medical care unless it has
been authorized by the patient. (SU)
… not use the personal information provided by
the patient for any purpose other than those
required for medical care. (SU)
… never sell their patients’ personal
information to other institutions unless it has
been authorized by the patient. (CO)
… not share patients’ personal information with
other institutions unless it has been authorized
by patients. (SU)
… repeatedly check the accuracy of patients’
personal information without considering the
cost. (ME)
… use more procedures to check the accuracy
of patients’ personal information. (ME)
… have more comprehensive procedure to
correct the errors in patients’ personal
information. (ME)
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Nurses Beliefs as Patients
Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) - Scales Integrated Throughout Items
42. Please indicate the extent at which you agree for the following statements.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Disagree

I would refuse to provide information to medical
facilities because I think it is too private.
I would misrepresent some of my personal
information if it is requested by medical facilities.
I would take some action to have my private
information removed from the EHR database when
it was not properly used.
I would speak with my acquaintances about my poor
experience with medical facilities’ mishandling of
my personal information.
I would contact medical facilities to complain about
the way they mishandled my personal information.
I would contact an elected official or consumer
protection organization to complain about the way
they mishandled my personal information by
medical facilities.
I would refuse to provide information to medical
facilities because I think it is too private.
I would misrepresent some of my personal
information if it is requested by medical facilities.
I would take some action to have my private
information removed from the EHR database when
it was not properly manipulated.
I would speak with my acquaintances about my poor
experience with medical facilities’ mishandling of
my personal information.
I would contact medical facilities to complain about
the way they mishandled my personal information.
I would contact an elected official or consumer
protection organization to complain about the way
they mishandled my personal information by
medical facilities.
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It bothers me when medical facilities ask me for
personal information.
I sometimes think for a while when medical
facilities ask me to provide personal information.
It bothers me to find personal information in so
many facilities.
It bothers me that medical facilities collect so much
personal information.
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Appendix F – Abbreviation Definitions
ARRA: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
CFIP: Concern For Information Privacy
o AU: Unauthorized access to medical information
o CO: Personal collection of medical information
o ME: Medical facilities errors
o SU: Medical facilities’ secondary use of medical information
EHR: Electronic Health Record
ePHI: Electronic Protected Health Information
HIT: Health Information Technology
HITECH: Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
IPPR: Information Privacy Protective Responses
KISS: Knowledge of Information Systems Security
MDH: Mobile Device Habits
PHI: Protected Health Information
PTP: Personal Technology Practices
RB: Risk Behaviors
RN: Registered Nurse
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Appendix G – National Student Nurse Association Social Media Guidelines
NSNA Guidelines
Student nurses should be cognizant of the potential impact of each post made, with
the understanding that patients, classmates, instructors, employers, and other
personal or professional contacts may view an individual’s online activity as a
reflection of the individual’s career as well as the nursing profession in general.
Student nurses should stay informed about the privacy settings of the social media
sites they utilize, as privacy settings often change.
Student nurses who utilize social networking sites should actively maintain an
awareness of how their
professionalism may be affected by friends’ and peers’ usage of the same sites.

Example

For example, Facebook previously offered a privacy setting that restricted anyone (even friends)
from viewing photos that you are tagged in. This was discontinued.
For example, Jane posts photos from a weekend party and tags Dave in several of them. Dave
immediately untags himself to maintain his professionalism. However, Jane has set her privacy
settings for the photo album so that “friends of friends” may view them. Even though Dave is no
longer tagged, all of Jane’s friends—and everyone connected to each friend of Jane—can view photos
of Dave that Jane uploaded.
A school president creates a public Facebook page that followers can “like” to maintain
professional networking and communications with the school chapter Board.

Student nurses who are elected/appointed officers should restrict their personal
activity to family and friends, and maintain a second option for their “public face” for
colleagues, classmates and peers while in office. This is also recommended for student
nurses who want to maintain a separation of their personal lives from their
After thoroughly reviewing the privacy setting options, a student chooses a
professional lives.
customized setting so that anyone in their “Restricted” group may only view their profile photo and
contact information. When a new professional contact requests friendship, the student adds the new
contact to their “Restricted” group and accepts the request. If the student would like to post a
healthcare related article, she/he may change the settings for that particular post so that all friends
can view it
Student nurses should not share, post, or otherwise disseminate any information, that
can identify a patient, or in any way violate a patient’s rights or privacy. Limiting access
through privacy setting is not sufficient to ensure privacy of patients.
Student nurses should never refer to anyone in a disparaging manner, even if the
person cannot be identified
with the information stated.
Student nurses should not make threatening, harassing, sexually explicit, or
derogatory statements regarding any person’s race, ethnicity, gender, age, citizenship,
national origin, sexual orientation, disability, religious beliefs, political views, or
educational choices.
Student nurses should not make disparaging remarks about any college, university, or
school of nursing, including the students, faculty members and staff.
Student nurses should not post content or otherwise speak on behalf of any college,
university, school of
nursing, or other student nurses association unless authorized to do so.
NSNA constituent school chapters, state associations and individual members should
refrain from social media usage that individually represents—or attempts to
represent—the voice of NSNA.

Figure 15 NSNA Social Media Guidelines
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Appendix H - Content Validity: Student Nurses’ Knowledge of Information System Security and
Risk Behaviors
(Original – Content Validity)
•
•

Please circle the appropriate number and provide comments where applicable.
Use the numerical value if corrected according to your commentary, not as it was originally
written
Survey Items
Representativeness
The purpose of this nation-wide pilot
1 = the item is not representative of a student nurse’s knowledge
survey is to assess student nurses’
or behavior of information system security.
knowledge of information system
security and assess their risk behaviors. 2 = the item needs major revisions to be representative of a
student nurse’s knowledge or behavior of information system
security.
3 = the item needs minor revisions to be representative of a
student nurse’s knowledge or behavior of information system
security.
4 = the item is representative of a student nurse’s knowledge or
behavior of information system security.
What is your current level of nursing
education?
First Year
Second Year
Third Year
Fourth Year
Enrolled in Diploma Program
Enrolled in Certificate Program (nonNP)
Enrolled in Master’s Program (nonNP)
Enrolled in an NP Program
Enrolled in PhD Program
Enrolled in DNP Program
Other (Please state)
Have you already been a Registered
Nurse?
Yes

1
Comments:

2

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

1
Comments:

3

2

4

No

4

No
Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No
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Does your program include lesson
material regarding Information System
security or electronic health record
security?
Yes

1
Comments:

2

3

4

No
Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No

156

(CONTINUED)
For my mobile device (phone/tablet), I….

1
2
Comments:

3

4

<Never/Sometimes/Frequently/Always>
• use my fingerprint, complex passcode, or gesture to
log in.
• regularly update my operating system.
• “jailbreak”, or use a customized environment to get
free apps.
• click on email links to reset my passwords.
• use free wifi at public locations such as cafes and
airports.
• keep my device attended and in my possession.
• encrypt my device (Apple uses may select always).
• text patient information with colleagues (aside from
corporate applications).
• use personal email containing patient information.
• accept invitations for games and apps through social
networks.
• download movies/music/apps by pirating or otherwise
without paying (aside from legit streaming services).
• use filesharing programs such as Azure, uTorrent,
Vuse, etc…
• have a complex wifi password on the home router.
• share my passwords (any) with others such as family,
friends, or coworkers.
• use autofill to complete my information in websites.
• submit my personal information such as name,
address, phone number, and credit card info into
websites when requested.
• chat with strangers online.
• post personal information on social media sites.
• have had my financial/credit information personally
breached (aside from publicized breaches of
corporations).
• have had my passwords stolen/misused. This would
be evident by unauthorized emails/posts sent or known
of sites/services accessed by unauthorized entities.

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No
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1) If my co-worker’s login does not work, I may
share mine.
True False

2) Putting patient information on a USB drive is
acceptable if…
a. my superior instructs me to do so.
b. the USB drive is encrypted and used in a manner
consistent with institutional policy.
c. I delete it shortly thereafter.
d. I keep the USB drive securely on my person at all
times.
3) Texting patient information is acceptable if…

1
2
Comments:

3

4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3

Yes

No
4

No
4

a. my superior instructs me to do so.
b. I am using a hospital-issued cell phone.
c. I am using a hospital-issued secure messaging
system.
d. I urgently need to communicate with a physician.

4) Placing patient information on my personal
computer is acceptable if…
a. my superior instructs me to do so.
b. I have antivirus and a firewall.
c. I am a private contractor with contracted
responsibility and liability.
d. None of the above
5) I may access my relative’s electronic health
information if…
a. my relative gave me verbal permission to do so.
b. I need information to care for this relative at home.
c. I was helping my relative access information
through the patient portal.
d. my superior instructs me to do so.

No
4

No
4

No
4
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6) If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s
chart….
a. I provide it on a USB drive.
b. I print out the chart.
c. I ask my supervisor for guidance.
d. I do not provide any information without a court
order and guidance from a supervisor.
7) If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I…
a. Hand it in to security or lost and found.
b. Use it at home.
c. Use it at the hospital.
d. Dispose of it in the garbage.

8) If I discover a coworker has accessed their
relative’s information, I…
a. Report this person to the supervisor or other
personnel per institution policy.
b. Remind the person that this behavior is not
acceptable and in violation of HIPAA regulations.
c. Do nothing as no action is necessary on my part.
d. Contact administration or hospital-supplied
privacy number.
9) If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my
password, I….
a. Provide it as the helpdesk is a trusted entity.
b. Would never provide my password.
c. Call back to helpdesk to verify identity.
d. Check with my supervisor first.
10) If IT (computer department) sends me an email to
upgrade my email and asks me to verify my
password, I…
a. Enter my username and password after clicking on
the email link in order to upgrade.
b. Report the email to the proper person.
c. Ask my supervisor for advice.
d. Delete the email.
11) If my password is not working and my coworker
offers to log in for me, I….
a. Let my coworker to log in so I can continue
working.
b. Respectfully refuse and contact the helpdesk for
assistance.
c. Already have no coworker’s password and log in.
d. Remind my coworker not to share passwords and
report if appropriate.

Comments:

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
Comments:

Yes

3

4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

1
2
Comments:

3

No

4

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No
4

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

No
4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

1
2
Comments:

No

No
4

Yes

No
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12) I can put patient data on a USB stick if…
a. I use it for work purposes.
b. I always keep it in my possession.
c. Make sure to delete the data when finished.
d. It is encrypted/scrambled and used according to
hospital policy.
13) If a website informs me that JAVA must be
updated, I…
a. Contact the helpdesk.
b. Install the file from the website.
c. Ask my supervisor.
d. Ignore the message.
14) If a computer message from the FBI states my
files have been scrambled and I must pay a $300 fine,
I…
a. Pay the file and have my files accessible.
b. Ignore the message and use another computer.
c. Contact the helpdesk.
d. Ask my supervisor.
15) If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and
requests a wire transfer, I….
a. Follow their instructions to avoid legal
repercussions.
b. Contact the helpdesk or security.
c. Hang up.
d. Report the call to the authorities.
16) If the phone regularly requires updates every few
months, I…
a. Update promptly.
b. Ignore the message.
c. Call the helpdesk.
d. Contact the phone carrier.
17) An email from my bank states my account has
been compromised and I must verify my identity by
clicking on a link and filling out some information.
I…
a. Enter my personal information to verify my
identity and preserve my account.
b. Ignore and delete the email.
c. Contact the helpdesk.
d. Call the bank.

1
2
Comments:

3

4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No
4

No
4

No
4

No
4

No
4

No
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18) My coworker received a strange email from me
requesting money. I…
a. Tell the coworker it’s a mistake and to just ignore
the email.
b. Ask the coworker to respond to the other email
address listed in the email to state that this is a
mistake.
c. Contact the helpdesk.
d. Contact that other email address in the email with a
nasty message.
19) A well-known national realtor sends an email
with the subject “Hot Properties In Your
Neighbourhood”. The link requests a Gmail or
Yahoo login to proceed. Assuming there’s an
interest, I…
a. Log in using my Gmail or Yahoo account.
b. Contact the helpdesk.
c. Delete the email.
d. Ask my supervisor.
20) The corner deli that typically delivers lunch
complains they received a fax with patient
information. I….
a. Instruct the deli to throw out the papers.
b. Instruct the deli to wait for me to pick up the
papers.
c. Contact helpdesk, compliance or other department
per policy.
d. Ask the deli to return the papers with the next
lunch delivery.
21) When leaving a computer logged in with my
password, I…
a. Lock the computer.
b. Sign out.
c. Leave it out of courtesy for my coworker.
d. Leave it asking my coworkers not to touch it.
22) A pop-up appears informing me the computer is
running slow, I….
a. Follow the instructions as the computer has been
running quite slow.
b. Close the pop-up and continue working.
c. Contact the helpdesk.
d. Ask the supervisor.

1
2
Comments:

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

1
2
Comments:

No

4

Yes

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

1
2
Comments:

Yes

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
Comments:

4

No

4

Yes

3

No

4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No
4

No
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23) Taking patient or chart photos with a cell phone
is acceptable if….
a. Deleted after using.
b. A program is used to cover any identifiable
information.
c. Done so in strict accordance with hospital policy if
policy permits.
d. Requested to do so by a doctor.
24) A person without a hospital badge states he is
from IT and needs me to login for him to fix the
slowness problem. I…
a. Log in for him as the electronic record as the
system has been slow.
b. Ask him for his hospital badge and upon display
log in for him.
c. Ask him for the hospital badge and state policy
will not permit you to log in for him.
d. Call security if he does not show the badge upon
request.
25) I may work with documents containing patient
information on my home computer or laptop.
a. If I delete the files afterward.
b. If I password protect my computer.
c. I my supervisor gives me permission.
d. No, this is not permitted.
26) If I need to look at my health record, I…
a. Look in the electronic health record as this is my
data and policy applies to other patients’ data.
b. Look in the electronic health record if explicitly
permitted by policy.
c. Use the patient portal or medical records
department.
d. Ask any doctor to look up my information.
27) If a law firm requests patient information, I…
a. Provide the information on a USB stick they
supply.
b. Print out the information for them.
c. Allow them to view the information, but not have a
copy.
d. Contact medical records, security, supervisor, or
other personnel as per policy.

1
2
Comments:

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
Comments:

Yes

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

1
2
Comments:

4

4

Yes

3

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

No
4

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

No

4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

1
2
Comments:

No

No
4

Yes

No
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28) If a standard computer without encryption has a
sensitive file that is purposefully deleted…
a. I can be sure that it is gone as I emptied the
computer trash container.
b. Do not know if it is really gone.
c. Definitely gone no matter what because I have a
password on my computer.
d. Only gone once I reboot.
29) It’s acceptable to backup patient information to
my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox, iCloud,
etc..) for safekeeping…
a. If I make sure I use a strong password.
b. If I delete the files when I’m done with them.
c. If I do not let anyone know.
d. Never as this is not permitted.
30) If my coworker suspects someone must have
looked at his/her health record due to gossip about
his/her condition, I would…
a. Assure my coworker that no one would have
looked at the health records.
b. Ask around who looked at the health record.
c. Warn people not to look at coworkers’ health
information.
d. Make an inquiry/report to corporate compliance or
appropriate entity per policy.
31) If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing
sensitive information, I….
a. Wait until the device turns up and take action later
if it does not.
b. Know it’s secure because I need a password to log
in.
c. Know it’s secure because I erased all of the
sensitive information.
d. Contact security, helpdesk or other entity as
required by policy.

1
2
Comments:

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
Comments:

4

Yes

3

4

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.
1
2
3
Comments:

Yes

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

Yes

1
2
Comments:

No
4

3

Item well written and succinct.
If no, please provide edits.

No

No

4

Yes

No
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Appendix J – Knowledge Test and Results Key
*Denotes designated correct response
Bold knowledge heading represents the corresponding reference number in the data analysis.
Knowledge 1
18. Putting patient information on a USB drive is acceptable if….
a)
b)
c)
d)

My superior instructs me to do so.
The USB drive encrypted and used in a manner consistent with institutional policy.*
I delete it shortly thereafter.
I keep the USB drive securely on my person at all times.

Knowledge 2
19. Texting patient information is acceptable if….
a)
b)
c)
d)

My supervisor instructs me to do so.
I am using a hospital-issued cell phone.
I am using a hospital-issued secure messaging system.*
I urgently need to communicate with a physician.

Knowledge 3
20. Placing patient information on my personal computer is acceptable if….
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

My supervisor instructs me to do so.
I have antivirus and a firewall.
I am a private contractor with contracted responsibility and liability.
I have a HIPAA-compliant logon.
None of the above.*

Knowledge 4
21. I may access my relative/spouse/partner/friend’s electronic health information if….
a)
b)
c)
d)

This person gave me permission to do so.
I need information to care for this relative at home.
I am helping this person to access information though the patient portal*
My supervisor instructs me to do so.

Knowledge 5
22. If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s chart…
a)
b)
c)
d)

I provide it on a USB drive
I print out the chart.
I ask my supervisor for guidance.*
I do not provide any information without a court order and would refer the office to the medical
records department.*
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Knowledge 6
23. If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Hand it in to security or lost and found.*
Use it at home.
Use it at the hospital.
Dispose of it in the garbage.

Knowledge 7
24. If I discover a coworker has accessed their relative’s information, I…
a)
b)
c)
d)

Report this person to the supervisor or other personnel per institution policy.*
Remind the person that this behavior is not acceptable and in violation of HIPAA regulations.
Do nothing as no action is necessary on my part.
Contact administration or hospital-supplied privacy number.*

Knowledge 8
25. If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my password, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Provide it as the helpdesk is a trusted entity.
Would never provide my password.*
Call back to helpdesk to verify identity.
Check with my supervisor first.

Knowledge 9
26. I can put patient data on a USB stick if….
a)
b)
c)
d)

I use it for work purposes.
I always keep it in my possession.
Make sure to delete the data when finished.
It is encrypted/scrambled and used according to hospital policy.*

Knowledge 10
27. If a website informs me that JAVA must be updated, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Contact the helpdesk.*
Install the file from the website.
Ask my supervisor.
Ignore the message.
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Knowledge 11
28. If a computer message from the FBI states my files have been scrambled and I must pay a
$300 fine, I…
a)
b)
c)
d)

Pay the fine and have my files accessible.
Ignore the message and use another computer.
Contact the helpdesk.*
Ask my supervisor.*

Knowledge 12
29. If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and requests a wire transfer, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Follow the instructions to avoid legal repercussions.
Contact the helpdesk or security.*
Hang up.*
Report the call to the authorities.*

Knowledge 13
30. An email from my bank states my account had been compromised and I must verify my
identity by clicking on a link and filling out some information, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Enter my personal information to verify my identity and preserve my account.
Ignore and delete the email.*
Contact the helpdesk.*
Call the bank.*

Knowledge 14
31. My coworker received a strange email from me requesting money, I….
a) Tell the coworker it’s a mistake and to ignore the email.
b) Ask the coworker to respond to the other email address listed in the email to state that this is a
mistake.
c) Contact the helpdesk*
d) Contact that other email address in the email with a nasty message.

Knowledge 15
32. A well-known national realtor sends an email with the subject “Hot Properties in Your
Neighborhood."
The link requests a Gmail or Yahoo login to proceed. Assuming there’s an interest, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Log in using my Gmail or Yahoo account.
Contact the helpdesk.*
Delete the email.
Ask my supervisor.
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Knowledge 16
33. The corner deli that typically delivers lunch complains they received a fax with patient
information, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Instruct the deli to throw out the papers.
Instruct the deli to wait for me to pick up papers.
Contact helpdesk, compliance or other department per policy.*
Ask the deli to return the papers with the next lunch delivery

Knowledge 17
34. When leaving a computer logged in with my password, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Lock the computer.*
Sign out.*
Leave it out courtesy for my coworker.
Leave it asking my coworkers not to touch it.

Knowledge 18
35. A pop-up appears informing me the computer is running slow, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Follow the instructions as the computer has been running quite slow.
Close the pop-up and continue working.
Contact the helpdesk.*
Ask the supervisor.

Knowledge 19
36. Taking patient or chart photos with my own cell phone is acceptable if….
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Delete after using.
A program is used to cover any identifiable information.
Done so in strict accordance with hospital policy permits.
Requested to do so by a doctor.
Never.*

Knowledge 20
37. A person without a hospital badge states he is from IT and needs me to login for him to fix
the slowness problem, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Log in for him as the electronic records as the system has been slow.
Ask him for his hospital badge and upon display log in for him.
Ask him for the hospital badge and state policy will not permit you to log in for him.*
Call security if he does not show the badge upon request.*
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Knowledge 21
38. I may work with documents containing patient information on my home computer or
laptop….
a)
b)
c)
d)

If I delete the files afterwards.
If I password protect my computer.
If my supervisor gives me permission.
No, this is not permitted.*

Knowledge 22
39. If I need to look at my health records, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Look in the electronic health records as this is my data and policy applies to other patient’s data.
Look in the electronic health records if explicitly permitted by policy.*
Use the patient portal or medical records department.*
Ask any doctor to look up my information.

Knowledge 23
40. If a law firm requests patient information, I….
a)
b)
c)
d)

Provide the information on a USB stick the supply.
Print out the information for them.
Allow them to view the information, but not have a copy.
Contact medical records, security, supervisor, or other personnel as per policy.*

Knowledge 24
41. If a standard computer without encryption has a sensitive file that is purposefully deleted…
a)
b)
c)
d)

I can be sure that it is gone as I emptied the computer trash container.
Do not know if it is really gone.*
Definitely gone no matter what because I have password on my computer.
Only gone once I reboot.

Knowledge 25
42. It’s acceptable to backup patient information to my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox,
iCloud, etc...) for safekeeping...
a)
b)
c)
d)

If I make sure I use a strong password.
If I delete the files when I’m done with them
If I do not let anyone know.
Never as this is not permitted.*
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Knowledge 26
43. If my coworker suspects someone must have looked at his/her health record due to gossip
about his/her condition, I would…
a)
b)
c)
d)

Assure my coworker that no one would have looked at the health records.
Ask around who looked at the health records.
Warn people not to look at coworkers’ health information.
Make an inquiry/report to corporate compliance or appropriate entity per policy.*

Knowledge 27
44. If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing sensitive information, I…
a)
b)
c)
d)

Wait until the device turns up and possibly report later.
Know it’s secure because I need a password to log in.
Know it’s secure because I erased all of the sensitive information.
Contact security, helpdesk or other entity as required by policy.*
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